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METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PLEAD.
INGS AND OF OBTAINING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
ERNEST A. FiNTE*
The trend to vest in the courts and to relinquish by the legislature
the authority to make rules of practice and procedure is ever increasing.1
At this writing there are such bills pending in Missouri and Texas, and
there will soon be such a measure prepared for the Kentucky legislature."
It is thought that an article here published dealing with the methods of
objecting to pleadings and of obtaining summary relief as existing in cer-
tain Northeastern states would not only be of interest in Aissouri but in
the Middle and Southwestern states, and would as well furnish some com-
parative material under one cover which might be of assistance in shaping
thought respecting the adoption of court rules on the specified subjects.
Obviously, however, some of the rules discussed would be unnecessary in
certain jurisdictions, because practice rules should be drafted to best
solve local problems.
Any revision of rules of practice and procedure, whether legislative
or court enacted, requires exhaustive research and comparative analysis
of similar rules in numerous jurisdictions. This article does not attempt
that, nor is an attempt made to analyze the innumerable decisions inter-
preting the rules relating to the specified practice, for such is within the
province of an authoritative local text. It is, however, the purpose of this
discussion to indicate the manner in which objections to pleadings and
*A.B., 1928, LL.B., 1930, Cornell. Member of the New York bar; lecturer in
Law, College of the City of New York; member of the American Citizenship Com-
mittee of the New York County Lawyers Association. Acknowledgment is made of
the cooperation of William M. Sheffeld in the preparation of the New Jersey and
Massachusetts material, and of suggestions by Pomeroy Day (Connecticut), Wil-
liam Kaufmann (New Jersey), S. Samuel Arsht (Delaware), and Philip W.
Amram (Pennsylvania), who is a member of the Pennsylvania Procedural Rules
Committee and an associate in Law at the University of Pennsylvania. The
writer alone, however, is responsible for opinions expressed.
1. Harris, The Eztent and Use of Rule-Making Authority (including statis-
tical table) (1938) 22 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 27. For three articles on rule-making ma-
chinery in Pennsylvania, see (1937) 21 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 101; (1938) 21 id. at
198; 22 id. at 158.
la. Since the preparation of this article the Missouri bill was defeated in
committee. Efforts are being made to cause reconsideration of the matter.
(114)
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METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PLEADINGS
motions for summary relief are made in certain Northeastern Atlantic
states, and with such various procedures in mind, attempt to suggest from
a practitioner's view what might constitute good court rules on the sub-
jects.
The states selected for this study are not, in the author's opinion, the
most advanced in their treatment of this branch of practice. Some, in fact,
may be properly called backward. Five of the six states included, how-
ever, handle a vast amount of litigation and may be considered representa-
tive of the jurisdictions in their section of the country.
Recognizing that it is impossible to find the rules of practice and
procedure of the various states within one volume, there is appended here-
to some of the most important statutory and court rules discussed, in the
belief that the consolidation and organization of this widely scattered ma-
terial will be of particular value to those interested in comparing the
actual statutes and rules.
NEw YoRK
In New York the statutes and rules to be considered are detailed and
specific. Demurrers and pleas have been abolished; objections to pleadings
are taken by motions, which must be specific, although the relief prayed
for may be in the alternative and one may move as to part of a pleading
and plead to a different part.2 Litigation in New York respecting the
considered motions has been tremendous, hence the case law reference is
only illustrative of general principals. The following classification may
be helpful:
I. Motions available to correct any pleading.
A. To state separately and number.3
B. To make definite and certain."
C. To add or drop parties.5
D. To strike out irrelevant and unnecessary matter.6
2. C. P. A. §§ 277, 280, 117, 281.
3. R. C. P. 90
4. R. C. P. 102.
5. R. C. P. 102. Misjoinder and non-joinder-if these defects appear on
the face of the pleading, they must be taken by motion; otherwise they are
waived. R. C. P. 105; C. P. A. § 278. See, however, C. P. A. §§ 192, 193, per-
mitting adding or dropping of parties at any stage of the cause.
6. R. C. P. 103.
1939]
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II. Motions for judgment dismissing various pleadings or parts thereof.
A. To dismiss the complaint or a cause of action therein if the
following defects appear on the face thereof.7
1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the de-
fendant.
2. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the ac-
tion (not waived) 8
3. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
4. That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause.
5. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action (not waived) .8
B. To dismiss the complaint or a cause of action therein if the fol-
lowing defects do not appear on the face thereof.'
1. Same grounds as II, A 1, 2, 3, and 4.
2. Res Adjudicata.
3. Statute of Limitations.
4. Release.
5. Statute of Frauds.
6. Infancy or other disability.
C. To treat an entire answer as a nullity if it is sham or frivolous.10
D. To dismiss a counterclaim or strike out an affirmative defense in
an answer if the following defects appear on the face thereof.1'
1. Same grounds as II, A 2, 3, 4, and 5.
2. That the counterclaim is not one which may be properly
interposed in the action.
3. That the defense consisting of new matter is insufficient in
law.12
7. R. C. P. 106.
8. This objectior is never waived and may be made at any time. C. P. A.
§ 279.
9. R. C. P. 107.
10. R. C. P. 104. Sufficiency of counterclaim cannot be tested on this motion.
Smith v. Smith, 137 App. Div. 911, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (1st Dep't 1910).
11. R. C. P. 109. Notice the word "judgment" is omitted from the rule, for
the dismissal of a counterclaim or affirmative defense still leaves in the answer
denials good in form. To be noticed within ten days after service of the answer.
12. Can be made at any time. C. P. A. § 279.
[Vol. 4
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E. To dismiss a counterclaim if the following defects do not appear
on the face thereof. 13
1. Same grounds as II, A 2, and 4; and II, B 2, 4, and 5.
F. To treat an entire reply as a nullity if it is sham or frivolous. 14
G. To strike out a reply or separate defense therein for in-
sufficiency.15
III. Motion for judgment on the pleadings after issue is joined.1 6
IV. Motion for summary judgment when an answer is served."
A. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on
1. A contract, express or implied, in fact or in law, sealed or
not sealed.
2. A judgment for a stated sum.
3. A statute where the sum sought is other than a penalty.
B. To recover an unliquidated debt or demand for money only on
1. A contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed, other
than for breach of promise to marry.
2. A statute where the sum sought is other than a penalty.
C. In the following equitable actions:
1. To recover possession of specific chattels with or without
a claim for hire or damages or the taking or detention there-
of.
2. To enforce or foreclose a lien or mortgage.
3. For specific performance of a written contract for the sale
or purchase of property, including alternative or incidental
relief as the case may require.
4. For an accounting arising on a written contract, sealed or
not sealed.
D. For the defendant, in any action where an answer is served al-
leging a defense which is sufficient as a matter of law, where the
defense is founded upon facts established prima facie by docu-
mentary evidence or official record.'
13. R. C. P. 110.
14. R. C. P. 104.15. R. C. P. 111. Notice the omission of the word "judgment." See note 11,
supra.
16. R. C. P. 112.
17. R. C. P. 113.
18. The third from the last paragraph of Rule 113 was thus construed inLederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459, 12 N. E. (2d) 544 (1938), overruling
previous lower court cases.
1939]
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V. Motion for partial judgment.10
To state separately and number.20 The purpose of this motion is to
unscramble a poorly drawn and confused pleading which fails to distinguish
properly and state separately different causes of action, counterclaims or
affirmative defenses which the pleader seeks to join, and to thereby enable
opposing counsel to plead responsively.2 1 While it is directed to a defect
of form,22 and no substantial right is forfeited by failure to move for its
correction,2 3 the motion is not for mere technical advantage, consequently a
party is entitled to know what he must answer and prepare to meet.24
Though no time is limited by the rules for the bringing of this motion,
as its purpose is to enable responsive pleading in an orderly manner, the
defect is usually waived unless made before answering or the filing of a
motion to dismiss the pleading concerned.2  The motion is determined
solely on the pleading attacked, and no affidavits are permitted.2 1
To make definite and certain.2 7 This motion, like the previous one, is
to aid a party to draw a responsive pleading; hence where a pleading is
ambiguous, equivocal, indefinite, uncertain or obscure, the remedy is to
move to require the pleading to be made more definite and certain by an
amendment.28 It is distinguishable from a motion for a bill of particulars
in that it is directed toward eliminating obscurity or indefiniteness of
language in what might otherwise be a proper pleading, whereas the
function of a bill of particulars in New York is to provide for the dis-
closure of more specific information than is required in a legally sufficient
19. R. C. P. 114.
20. R. C. P. 90.
21. Cohen & Co. v. Japan Cotton & Silk Trading Co., Inc., 250 App. Div.
770 (2d Dep't 1937).
22. Hence, defects claimed must be specified in the notice of motion. R. C. P.
62.
23. Krower v. Reynolds, 99 N. Y. 245, 1 N. E. 775 (1885).
24. Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N. Y. 230, 11 N. E. (2d)
890 (1937).
25. Brown-Duffy Goatskin Corp. v. Henkel, 211 App. Div. 342, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 1925). "Special circumstances may reqiire the granting
of relief under Rule 90, after answer." O'Hara v. Derschug, 232 App. Div. 31,
248 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't 1931).
26. Upson Co. v. Erie R. R., 213 App. Div. 262, 210 N. Y. Supp. 112 (4th
Dep't 1925).
27. R. C. P. 102.
28. Prescott v. Guibord, 236 App. Div. 170, 258 N. Y. Supp. 133 (3d Dep't
1932). To find a cause of action the court need not wade through a mass of
verbiage and superfluous matter. Cohen v. Pyramid Bond & Mtg. Corp., 235 App.
Div. 811, 256 N. Y. Supp. 754 (2d Dep't 1932); Tankoos v. Conford Realty Co.,
Inc., 248 App. Div. 614, 287 N. Y. Supp. 823 (2d Dep't 1936).
[Vol. 4
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pleading so as to narrow the issues and prevent surprise at the trial, as
well as to facilitate preparation therefor.29
The motion is made on specified objections which are waived unless
raised within the time specified.30 It often prays for some further relief,
as for example, to state and number separately and to strike out of the
pleading certain matter. The pleading alone is considered; affidavits are
improper.3 1 Failure to move as provided may be penalized in subsequent
proceedings by construing the defective pleading adversely to the party
failing to make timely objection.3 2
To add or drop parties.3 3 While misjoinder, non-joinder and defect
of party remedies may be had by motion under Rule 102, the relief there
specified is not exclnsive3 4
To strike out irrelevant and unnecessary matter.3 5 Where a pleading
contains unnecessary, improper, impertinent, scandalous, irrelevant, re-
dundant, repetitions, sham or frivolous matter, a motion specifying the
objectionable matter may be made to strike out such matter, and if the
motion is granted, the pleading is deemed amended accordingly. Only two
of the terms used have somewhat different meanings from those commonly
known. A pleading or matter is sham when it is so clearly false in fact
that it does not in reality involve any matter of substantial litigation.3"
Frivolous, on the other hand, is matter which is so clearly and palpably
bad as to indicate bad faith on the part of the pleader and to require no
argument and no reasoning by the court to determine it is bad.37 While
29. Matter of Mechler, 129 Misc. 549, 221 N. Y. Supp. 606 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
"The one remedy (bill of particulars] amplifies, by convenient specification,
what is already well alleged in a general charge. The other substitutes for
matter capable of misconstruction an amended statement which is iot capable
of misconstruction." (1898) 25 Abb. N. Cas. 131, note. See also the new R. C. P.
115, re bills of particulars.
30. The motion must be made within 20 days after service of th& defec-
tive pleading. Rule 105. But in Levin v. Levin, 157 Misc. 156, 283 N. Y. Supp.
720 (Sup. Ct. 1935), the service of an answer during the pendency of the motion
was held not to be an abandonment of the motion.
31. Deubert v. City of N. Y., 126 App. Div. 359, 110 N. Y. Supp. 403 (2d
Dep't 1908). Nor may proof be taken by a referee and reported to the court
on such a motion. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 28 Hun 436 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
32. Sorenson v. Keesey Hosiery Co., 244 N. Y. 73, 154 N. E. 826 (1926).
33. R. C. P. 102.
34. See note 5, supra.
35. R. C. P. 103.
36. People v. McCumber, 18 N. Y. 315, 320 (1858); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
v. City of N. Y., 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd,
no opinion, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. (2d) 385 (1936).
37. Youngs v. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672 (1871); Munden v. McDaniel, 152 Misc.
472, 274 N. Y. Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1934); see also, Hespe v. Corning Glass
Works, 9 F. Supp. 725 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
1939]
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motions under this rule are to be decided on the pleadings, those claiming
sham may require affidavits.38 If no motion is made under the rule within
the specified time and before answer or motion to dismiss, the objection
is waived, 9 although an answer served during the pendency of the motion
is not deemed an abandonment of the motion or a waiver of the right to
appeal.10
To dismiss the complaint when the defect appears on the face thereof.41
There are five specified grounds for a motion for judgment when the de-
fect appears on the face of the complaint.4 2 Motions must be noticed within
twenty days after the service of the complaint; otherwise they are waived.
43
Two of the grounds, that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the
action and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, are never waived and hence will not be mentioned herein-
after. They may be raised at any time, i. e., after answer, at the trial, 4" and
even though no objection was taken at the trial, the existence of either
of these two defects may be the basis of an appeal.4 No affidavits are con-
sidered on any of the enumerated grounds."0
The failure of the complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action is the principal objection of the five grounds and the most
used. Averments which sufficiently point out the nature of the pleader's
claims are sufficient, if under them he would be entitled to give the neces-
38. Affidavits are necessary to show denials are sham, but are not neces-
sary or proper to show a pleading is frivolous. Fleischer v. Terker, 259 N. Y.
60, 181 N. E. 14 (1932).
39. R. C. P. 105.
40. Rothenberg v. Metzger, 227 App. Div. 444, 238 N. Y. Supp. 139 (2d
Dep't 1929).
41. R. C. P. 106.
42. Lack of jurisdiction of the person, i. e., a foreign ambassador or a
foreign executor, must be raised by a motion on special appearance; otherwise
a general appearance and waiver would result. Meyers v. American Locomotive
Co., 201 N. Y. 163, 94 N. E. 605 (1911). For lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter, see People v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 42 N. Y. 283 (1870). Lack
of plaintiff's capacity to sue includes infancy, insanity, and a foreign corpora-
tion not having obtained a certificate of authority to do business within the
state. Wood & Selick v. Ball, 190 N. Y. 217, 83 N. E. 21 (1907). Tlie pendency
of another action means another action in this state. Barnes v. Andrews, 208
App. Div. 856, 204 N. Y. Supp. 326 (2d Dep't 1924); see also for an illustration,
Cornell v. Bonsall, 176 App. Div. 798, 163 N. Y. Supp. 384 (2d Dep't 1917).
Failure to state a cause of action would be, for example, failure to allege due
performance of a condition precedent in a contract action.
43. C. P. A. § 278.
44. C. P. A. § 279.
45. Halpern v. Langrock Bros. Co., 169 App. Div. 464, 155 N. Y. Supp.
167*(2d Dep't 1915).
46. King v. Krischer Mfg. Co., Inc., 220 App. Div. 584, 222 N. Y. Supp. 66(1st Dep't 1927).
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sary evidence to establish his cause of action.47 For the purpose of motions
under this subdivision, as in a demurrer, the facts alleged in the com-
plaint are deemed admitted,4 8 and where the facts as thus deemed admitted
would not support a recovery, the complaint is bad.49 It is thus a ques-
tion of law whether the complaint is sufficient.9 A bill of particulars
is not part of the pleadings and is not ordinarily read with the complaint,
although it may be."1
To dismiss the complaint when the defect does not appear on the face
thereof.92 Motions under this rule require an affidavit, unlike motions under
Rule 106, stating facts tending to show that defects exist which do not
appear on the face of the complaint, and answering affidavits are per-
mitted. Actually, the practice is an adaptation of the old equity practice
of raising questions of law by a plea in bar and having them determined
before the defendant pleaded to the merits. 8 A comparison of the nine
grounds in Rule 107 with the six grounds in Rule 106, discloses that the
first four grounds are identical. The fifth ground of Rule 106 of course
cannot be repeated in Rule 107, as the defect would have to appear on
the face of the complaint. There are, therefore, five new or additional
grounds for objecting to a complaint, not found in Rule 106. These are
briefly res adjudicata, Statute of Limitations, release, Statute of Frauds,
and infancy or disability of the defendant, and are too well known to re-
quire illustration.
It is intended that all the foregoing motions with the two indicated ex-
ceptions be made within 20 days from the date of the service of the com-
plaint or before answer, with the right, however, to plead the defenses
specified in Rule 107 in the answer." The motions relating to matters
of form usually result in orders permitting amendment; those made under
47. Rockefeller v. Kellas, 222 App. Div. 368, 226 N. Y. Supp. 325 (3d Dep't
1928).
48. Klemin v. Smith, 161 Misc. 189, 291 N. Y. Supp. 292 (Sup. Ct. 1936)
mod. on other grounds, 250 App. Div. 269, 293 N. Y. Supp. 981 (1st Dep't 1937).
49. Graham v. Buffalo General Laundries Corp., 261 N. Y. 165, 184 N. E.
746 (1933).
50. Hull v. Hull, 225 N. Y. 342, 122 N. E. 252 (1919).
51. Boliver v. Monnat, 135 Misc. 446, 238 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1929),
aff'd, 232 App. Div. 33, 248 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4th Dep't 1931) admissions in a bill
of particulars may be used to disclose weakness in a complaint but a bill can not
be used to bolster a weak pleading.
52. R. C. P. 107.
53. Herzog v. Brown, 217 App. Div. 402, 216 N. Y. Supp. 134 (1st Dep't
1926).
54. Gentilala v. Fay Taxicabs, Inc., 214 App. Div. 255, 212 N. Y. Supp.
101 (1st Dep't 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 243 N. Y. 397, 153 N. E. 848 (1926).
1939]
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Rule 106, where the defect appears on the face of the complaint, may result
in an order dismissing the complaint or one permitting amendment or one
granting such other relief as may be just. If the complaint is dismissed,
the dismissal is not on the merits and a new action may be brought as long
as the same defect does not again exist."
Under Rule 107 the court in its order may dismiss with leave to amend,
direct the inclusion of the objection in the defendant's answer, or direct
the facts be found by a jury or referee. In the latter, the order must clearly
and succinctly state the questions of fact and direct that these be tried
by a jury or referee, the findings of which shall be reported to the court
for its action." Alleged duress in obtaining a release, which release is set
up as a defense, would be an example of the nature of facts which might
be submitted to a jury or referee." An example of directing that the facts
be set up in the defendant's answer would be where the issue of fact in-
volves the merits of the plaintiff's entire case.
If the time of the defendant to answer 8 expires during the pendency
of the motion, the defendant is allowed, unless the court orders otherwise,
ten days after notice of entry of the order disposing of the motion is
served."
To treat an entire answer or reply as a nullity."9 There are two grounds
upon which such a motion may be made. If an entire answer is sham, or
frivolous, a motion may be made praying that the answer or reply be
treated as a nullity and that judgment be rendered accordingly; whereupon
the court may dismiss the pleading or allow a new one to be served on
such terms as it deems just. The motion is specifically limited to an at-
tack on an answer and reply; hence a counterclaim which is subject to at-
tack on grounds specified in Rule 109 is not within the purview of Rule 104.
55. C. P. A. § 283. Joannes Bros. Co. v. Lamborn, 237 N. Y. 207, 142 N. E.
587 (1923).
56. See R. C. P. 108, and Barker v. Conley, 267 N. Y. 43, 195 N. E. 677(1935). The facts decided by the jury must determine the case one way or
the other.
57. Rizzuto v. U. S. Shipping Board, 213 App. Div. 326, 210 N. Y. Supp.
482 (2d Dep't 1925).
58. Twenty days from service of the complaint.
59. C. P. A. § 283.
60. R. C. P. 104. In Wayland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281 (1871), it was held
a verified answer containing general denials could not be dismissed as sham. To
the same effect, where the denial was on information and belief, see Rockowitz
v. Siegel, 151 App. Div. 636, 136 N. Y. Supp. 192 (1st Dep't 1912). See, however,
People v. McCumber, 18 N. Y. 315 (1858), where such an attack was allowed,
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There was lack of uniformity with regard to whether affidavits might be
used when sham was claimed; now it is clear they may be used." If it is
frivolous, no affidavits may be considered. 2 The motion must be made with-
in 20 days from the time the defective answer or reply is served.63
When the defect appears on the face of the counterclaim.6 ' This rule
gives to a plaintiff essentially the same grounds to object, within 10 days
after service of the answer, to the defendant's counterclaim or affirmative
defense as the defendant had with respect to the plaintiff's complaint.
There are six grounds for objection under this Section. Comparison with
the grounds specified in Rule 106 shows that four of them are the same.
That the counterclaim is not one which may be properly interposed in the
action means that it does not comply with the essentials prescribed by
statute."5 That the defense consisting of new matter, called an affirmative
defense, is insufficient in law is again the Code substitute for a demurrer,
and hence the facts alleged are deemed true. No affidavits are considered. 6
The motion to strike out an affirmative defense, however, searches the
record and involves the sufficiency of the complaint as well as the affirmative
defense.67 Motions to dismiss the counterclaim for insufficiency do not, how-
ever, "search the record".6
When the defect does izot appear on the face of the counterclaim.9
The pleadings and supporting affidavits are considered. As the five grounds
of objection are the same as five of the eight grounds specified under Rule
107 regarding a complaint, and as the motion is determined by the same
rule, i. e. 108, no further discussion is necessary.
Additional defendants brought in as a result of a counterclaim may
reply to the counterclaim within 20 days, but because they are defendants
61. Fleischer v. Terker, 259 N. Y. 60, 181 N. E. 14 (1932). "If it is to be
disposed of on motion, its falsity must be determined by affidavits."
62. Partenfelder v. People, 157 App. Div. 462, 142 N. Y. Supp. 915 (2d Dep't
1913), aff'd, 211 N. Y. 355, 105 N. E. 675 (1914).
63. R. C. P. 105.
64. R. C. P. 109.
65. C. P. A. §§ 266-269, 271. "A counterclaim may be any cause of action
in favor of the defendants or some of them against the plaintiffs or some of
them, a person whom a plaintiff represents, or a plaintiff and another person or
persons alleged to be liable." § 266.
66. Romaneck v. Romaneck, 250 App. Div. 734 (2d Dep't 1937).
67. Trenkman v. Smith, 226 App. Div. 774, 234 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't
1929).
68. Fulton Co. G. & E. Co. v. Hudson Riv. T. Co., 200 N. Y. 287, 93 N. E.
1052 (1911); MacLoon v. Levy, 131 Misc. 790, 228 N. Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct.
1928).
69. R. C. P. 110.
1939]
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the remedies provided in Rule 109 are not available to them, for it specifies
that "the plaintiff" may make the application under said rule, and these
newly brought in defendants may only serve a reply or an appearance.70
To strike out the reply or a separate defense therein. 1 If a reply or a
separate defense therein is insufficient in law upon the face thereof, the de-
fendant may, within 10 days after service of the reply, move to strike it
out. This motion in effect is the same as the motion to strike out new matter
in a defense on the ground of insufficiency in law as provided in Rule 109,
with the additional requirement, however, that the reply must not contain
matter inconsistent with the complaint.72 The motion searches the record
to the extent that it will test the sufficiency of a counterclaim but not the
sufficiency of the complaint.
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. This motion after issue is
joined may only be made on two grounds, i. e., lack of jurisdiction of the
court over the subject of the action and failure of a pleading to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense. As the motion can be
made only after answer, the case may be moving up on the trial calendar
while the sufficiency of the pleadings is being tested; consequently, it does
not delay a case at all, while motions made before answer usually do. The
motion encompasses the determination of questions of law7" and is in effect
a demurrer.7'
The sufficiency of any pleading may be raised on the motion. It truly
searches the record, and thus differs from Rule 109, as the court may give
judgment to any party, regardless of which one makes the motion, for the
first bad pleading is condemned. 5 Usually only the pleadings are con-
sidered, although under certain circumstances the bills of particulars may
be considered on the motion.7 6 The allegations in the pleadings are deemed
70. C. P. A. § 271. Stokes v. Ottoman American Dev. Co., 132 Misc. 125,
228 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, no opinion, 224 App. Div. 833 (1st
Dep't 1928).
71. R. C. P. 111.
72. C. P. A. § 272. Streeter v. Cloud, 171 App. Div. 572, 157 N. Y. Supp.
698 (1st Dep't 1916).
73. Godwin v. Liberty-Nassau Bldg. Co., 144 App. Div. 164, 128 N. Y. Supp.
791 (1st Dep't 1911); Levy Leasing Co. v. Cohen, 145 Misc. 810, 261 N. Y. Supp.
145 (N. Y. City Ct. 1932).
74. Matter of Hearn, 158 Misc. 370, 285 N. Y. Supp. 935 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
75. R. C. P. 112, last phrase, and 3 CARMODY, PLEADING & PRACTICn IN Nnw
Yon (1929-1937) 2351-2.
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admitted for the purpose of the motion and every legitimate inference
drawn therefrom is resolved in favor of the pleader.78  Neither party is
entitled to judgment on the pleadings if on their face an issue of fact
remains to be tried.7 9 The courts have adopted a practice permitting an
amendment if it is believed the defect may be cured by a new pleading.80
Where both sides move for judgment on the pleadings, there no longer re-
mains any question requiring proof or submission of the case to the jury. 1
Motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is available to a
plaintiff or a defendant and may be rendered on motion in eight specified
types of actions as listed in Rule 113. By decision of the New York Court
of Appeals the third from the last paragraph of said rule has been inter-
preted to permit summary judgment being rendered in am kind of an
action where the defendant brings the motion and where the defense is
founded upon facts established prima facie by documentary evidence or
official record and where no issue respecting the verity and conclusive-
ness of such record exists.8 2
The purpose of this motion is to "defeat the law's delays" by giving
prompt relief to those having a good, clearcut claim or defense. It is used
a great deal in New York8 3 and provides a rather simple method for a
preliminary inquiry into the merit of a cause of action or defense. Space
prevents a complete description of the mechanics of the motion. 4 Briefly,
however, if the plaintiff moves for judgment, his affidavits must show evi-
77. Saragovitz v. Cohen, 147 Misc. 557, 264 N. Y. Supp. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
78. McCormick v. Westchester Lighting Co., 142 Misc. 27, 252 N. Y. Supp.
849 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, no opinion, 238 App. Div. 845 (2d Dep't 1933).
79. Fleischer v. Terker, 259 N. Y. 60, 181 N. E. 14 (1932).
80. Wnuk v. Tull, 151 Misc. 3, 270 N. Y. Supp. 520 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
81. Crown Corset Co. v. Ludwig Baumann & Co., 213 App. Div. 113, 210
N. Y. Supp. 60 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd, no opinion, 241 N. Y. 606, 150 N. E. 574(1926).
82. Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459, 12 N. E. (2d) 544 (1938)
(specifically overruling previous lower court cases). It was urged that a motion
for summary judgment was available only in the eight specified types of action
listed in Rule 113. The court distinguishes between sound reasons existing for
limiting summary judgment where proof is dependent upon affidavits made by
persons not subject to cross-examination, and no reasons existing for imposing
such a limitation where a legal defense is established by documentary evidence
or official record, and where no issue exists about the verity and conclusiveness
of such record. See also Tymon v. Tyrose Homes, Inc., 253 App. Div. 900 (2d
Dep't 1938), rood'd, 254 App. Div. 591, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 974 (2d Dep't 1938).
83. See Saxe, Summary Judgments in New York, A Statistical Study(1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 237.
84. For a concise description of the mechanics relating to the motion, see
Rule 113 in the Appendix, and for an excellent detailed discussion, see Shientag,
Summary Judgment (1935) 4 FoRDHA-l L. Rnv. 186. For history of summary
judgment in New York, see Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922).
1939]
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dentiary facts entitling him to judgment. If the defendant moves, his
affidavits must allege evidentiary facts which disclose defenses and show
that his denials and contentions are sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. The
motion by either party will be defeated if the other party shows facts
which may be deemed by the juage sufficient to entitle him to a trial of the
issues.
It is interesting to note the distinction between a motion for summary
judgment and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The former may
be made only in the specified types of actions and under certain eircum-
stances; the latter may be made in any type of case without limitation.
In the former, affidavits are considered, for the motion does not depend
upon the pleadings alone, but instead on evidence relied on by each party
to sustain the ultimate facts alleged in each pleading, such evidence being
set forth in the supporting affidavits. In the latter, the pleadings alone
and the bills of particulars are considered. In a motion for summary judg-
ment the court goes behind the pleadings which on their face appear suf-
ficient, and determines whether each party in his affidavits is urging in
good faith facts which create a debatable issue of fact which should be
tried.
The distinction between this motion and one to dismiss an entire
answer for sham under Rule 104 is that the sham motion may be made
in any action and also that in the sham motion the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the falsity of the sham answer beyond doubt; ' whereas on a
summary judgment motion the plaintiff need only show facts sufficient in
law to entitle him to judgment, and the burden then shifts to the defend-
ant to, show that he in good faith disputes the existence of the facts relied
on by the plaintiff or that other facts exist which give him a good defense.8
While the actions specified in subdivisions 1 through 8 of summary
judgment Rule 113 are specific, for the purpose of illustration a case
brought under each classification is given in the notes. 7
85. People v. McCumber, 18 N. Y. 315 (1858); Municipal Bank v. Parkway
Walk Constr. Corp., 224 App. Div. 864 (2d Dep't 1928).
86. Lee v. Graubard, 205 App. Div. 344, 199 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't
1923); Galusha Stove Co. v. Pivnick Const. Co., Inc., 132 Misc. 875, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
87. R. C. P. 113, subdivision (1). Waxman v. Williamson, 256 N. Y. 117,
175 N. E. 534 (1931); Poland Export Corp. v. Marcus, 204 App. Div. 302, 198
N. Y. Supp. 5 (1st Dep't 1923). (2) Pinney v. Geraghty, 209 App. Div. 630,
205 N. Y. Supp. 645 (3d Dep't 1924). But alimony judgment is not within rule.
Southard v. Southard, 133 Misc. 259, 232 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1928). (3)
Rainville v. Keil, 148 Misc. 795, 266 N. Y. Supp. 867 (N. Y. Cty. Ct. 1933). (4)
(Vol. 4
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The test of the determination of the motion is important. It is not
which party by his affidavits has convinced the court he is right, but is,
instead, whether the court is satisfied that there is a triable issue of fact in
the action.8 8 Where there is no triable issue other than the assessment of
damages, it does not prevent summary judgment, for the plaintiff may still
have a trial as to the amount of the damages. 89 If the defendant fails to
file replying affidavits alleging evidentiary facts showing there is merit
to his defense and that the denials are not sham, the motion will be decided
in favor of the plaintiff. 90 Complicated questions of law will not defeat
the motion. 91
Where the defendant's counterclaim is less than the plaintiff's claim,
and he does not attack the plaintiff's claim, judgment for the difference
between the amount demanded by the plaintiff and the amount demanded
by the defendant in his counterclaim may be given.92 'Where, however, the
defendant's counterclaim demands a sum larger than that demanded in
the plaintiff's complaint, no summary judgment may be granted the plain-
tiff.93
379 Madison Avenue v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 App. Div. 567, 275 N. Y. Supp.
953 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, no opinion, 268 N. Y. 576, 198 N. E. 412 (1935);
Garfunkel v. Pennsylvania R. R., 147 Misc. 810, 266 N. Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct.
1932) (assessment of damages ordered). (5) LeFevre v. Reliable Paint Supply
Co., Inc., 152 Misc. 594, 273 N. Y. Supp. 903 (N. Y. City Ct. 1934). (6) Brescia
Const. Co. v. Walart Const. Co., Inc., 238 App. Div. 360, 264 N. Y. Supp. 862(1st Dep't 1933). (7) Liss v. Continental Casualty Co., 245 App. Div. 670, 284
N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't 1935). (8) City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Charity
Organization Soc., 238 App. Div. 720, 265 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd,
no opinion, 264 N. Y. 441, 191 N. E. 504 (1934); Northport Trust Co. v. Richard-
son, 245 App. Div. 733, 280 N. Y. Supp. 389 (2d Dep't 1935).
88. General Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139
N. E. 216 (1923). Cardozo, J., in Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N. Y. 267, 146 N. E.
375 (1925), stated "There must be a failure on the part of the defendant to
satisfy the court 'by affidavit or other proof' that there is any basis for his denial
or any truth in his defense." See also, Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman, 236 N. Y.
22, 139 N. E. 766 (1923). A bank's answer and its affidavits in opposition to a
summary judgment motion raised a question of fact, claiming a check was cer-
tified in error, and this was held sufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact and
so summary judgment was denied. Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of U. S., 259 N. Y.
365, 182 N. E. 18 (1932).
89. Livingston v. Blumenthal, 248 App. Div. 138, 289 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1st
Dep't 1936).
90. Lee v. Graubard, 205 App. Div. 344, 199 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st
Dep't 1923); Galusha Stove Co. v. Pivnick Const. Co., 132 Misc. 875, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Geraci v. Farbozi, 161 Misc. 450, 291 N. Y. Supp.
86 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
91. Coutts v. Kraft & Bros. Co., 119 Misc. 260, 196 N. Y. Supp. 135 (Sup.
Ct. 1922), aff'd, no opinion, 206 App. Div. 625 (2d Dep't 1923); Kennilwood v.
Wall, 148 Misc. 67, 264 N. Y. Supp. 136 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
92. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n v. Egli, 228 App. Div. 164, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 152 (4th Dep't 1930).
93. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. National Dry Dock & Repair Co., 230 App. Div.
486, 245 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dep't 1930).
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Unlike the practice in England and New Jersey, the court must enter
an unconditional order granting or denying the motion.94 The judgment
entered as a result of the motion is appealable, and the appeal is usually
taken from both the order and the judgment-"
Partial Summary Judgment.9 If in an action specified in Rule 113
it appears that a defense applies to only a part of the plaintiff's claim, or
that a defense admits only part of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff may
obtain judgment by a motion for partial summary judgment for so much
of his claim as is admitted or as is not attacked, and the action may be
severed as to the balance. What was said with respect to motions for sum-
mary judgment is equally applicable to the limited rule regarding partal
summary judgment.
NEw JERSEY
As compared to the relatively complex and explicit provisions of the
New York practice on this subject, the rules in New Jersey may seem
brief and limited in scope. To a certain extent this is undoubtedly true,
but the contrast is largely due to the difference in the system of practice
used in these two jurisdictions. Whereas New York is a code pleading
state whose Practice Act was written to supplant the previously existing
common law system, 7 the practice of New Jersey is still common law, 8 but
with statutory modification" to remove objectionable rigidity of form.100
New Jersey has departed from common law formal pleas and demurrers
94. Gibson v. Standard Auto Mut. Cas. Co., 208 App. Div. 91, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 53 (1st Dep't 1924); King Motor Sales Corp. v. Allen, 209 App. Div. 281,
204 N. Y. Supp. 555 (4th Dep't 1924).
95. Donnelly v. Bauder, 217 App. Div. 59, 216 N. Y. Supp. 437 (4th Dep't
1926). An appeal may be taken from the judgment even though the time limited
to appeal from the order has expired. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Foldesy, 248
N. Y. 655, 162 N. E. 563 (1928).
96. R. C. P. 114.
97. 1 CARIMODY, PLEADING & PRACTICE IN Nnw YoRx (1929-1937) § 106.
98. Ward v. Huff, 94 N. J. L. 81, 109 Atl. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Lully v.
National Surety Co., 106 N. J. L. 81, 148 AtI. 762 (1930). There are separate
law and equity courts. N. J. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
99. The Practice Acts of 1903 and 1912, and Rules of Supreme Court of
1912 comprise most of such modification. They have not since been amended
in any basic respect. See note 101, infra.
100. This has been largely accomplished by liberalizing the rules of plead-
ing with reference to joinder of parties, causes of action, inconsistent counts and
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for the correcting and testing of defective pleadings, and the present prac-
tice in this regard, as well as with respect to summary judgment, is found
in the statutes and court rules.10 1 The following outline of the motion
practice may be helpful:
I. Motions attacking jurisdiction and relating to procedural defects.
(Pleas to jurisdiction; pleas in abatement.)
A. To dismiss the suit or to quash the summons where the defect
does not appear on the record (dilatory pleas) .1 02
1. For lack of jurisdiction over the person.
2. For lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
3. Because the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
4. Because a prior action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause.
II. Motions addressed to the complaint.
A. Relating to defects and irregularities in form.
1. To strike out the complaint (but with discretion in the court
to permit an amendment thereof) for duplicity, obscurity,
uncertainty, unnecessary repetition, prolixity, impertinence,
or where it is so framed as to embarrass or delay a fair
trial.1 03
2. To strike out a count of the complaint for superfluity.
101. N. J. Rnv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27; Rules of the Supreme Court(Rev'd 1938), 16 N. J. Misc. 837 (1938). This discussion is limited to law prac-
tice. The equity procedure may be found in REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 29, and
the Rules of the Court of Chancery (1938), 16 N. J. Misc. 585 (1938).
102. See discussion in Parks v. McClellan, 44 N. J. L. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
Other dilatory objections available include: irregularities in issuance or service
of process, defects in description of parties, discrepancy between summons and
complaint, faulty venue, and non-payment of costs in prior action. See HARRIS,
PLEADING & PRACTICE IN NEw JERssy (Rev. ed. 1939) §§ 272, 273, 275, 276, 278,
279, 280.
103. Motions relating to joinder of parties and causes are omitted. The
rules relating to joinder are, however, liberal. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27,
§ 31 provides that non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall not defeat the action,
but a motion to compel plaintiff to amend is available to correct defects in parties,
and a motion to strike on this ground is improper. C. Cedar Cove, Inc., v. Staub,
9 N. J. Misc. 885, 155 At. 886 (Sup. Ct. 1931). Piactically the only restraint
on joinder of causes is that the separate causes shall be susceptible of convenientjoint trial. Rnv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 37; S. C. R. 21. Impropriety ofjoinder is waivable and may be raised by motion to strike before answer (or
reply). S. C. R. 22. The motion is decided on the face of the pleading and the
court will allow plaintiff to elect, Murphy v. Patten, 85 Atl. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1912);
or separate the causes into two separate actions. See Weinberger v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 81 N. J. L. 127, 79 Atl. 542 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Davis v. Pub. Ser. Corp.,
77 N. J. L. 275, 72 Atl. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
1939]
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B. Relating to defects in substance appearing on the face of the
complaint.
1. To strike out the complaint (but with discretion in the court
to permit an amendment thereof).
(a) Same grounds as I, A. 1-4, supra.
(b) Because the complaint does not disclose a cause of ac-
tion.
C. To strike out the complaint for sham.
III. Motions addressed to the answer, reply and subsequent pleadings.
A. Relating to defects and irregularities in form.
1. To strike out the answer, reply, rejoinder, et cetera (but with
discretion in the court to permit an amendment) where it is
defective or irregular or so framed as to embarrass or pre-
vent a fair trial, for duplicity, unnecessary repetition, pro-
lixity, uncertainty, argumentiveness, or the presence of ir-
relevant matter.
B. For objections in point of law.
1. To strike out the answer, reply, rejoinder, et cetera, as 'in-
sufficient in law.
2. To strike out the answer and for summary judgment where
it is sham or insufficient in law.
3. To strike out the reply, rejoinder, et cetera, for a departure.
IV. Motions addressed to a counterclaim.1' 0
(Motions relating to matters in abatement and motions addressed
to the complaint, except motions to strike for lack of jurisdiction
over the person are applicable.) 105
The above outline is based on the common law classification and does
not in all cases represent distinctions recognized in the modern practice.
For instance, matters in abatement were at common law taken by plea
where the defect did not appear on the record, 00 but by demurrer where
104. A counterclaim is treated as a cross-action. S. C. R. 66.
105. See also motion to strike a counterclaim on the ground that it may not
be conveniently disposed of in the action. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 137,
141.
106. 49 C. J. 179, § 197; id. at 233, § 275.
[Vol.
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it was apparent on the face of the pleadings. 107 Both the dilatory pleas and
demurrers have now been supplanted by motions, 108 and as a matter of
practice, the objections are in effect taken by the same motion, 0 9 whether
the defect is apparent on the record or not. Of course, if the defect is not
apparent, the motion must be supported by deposition or evidence sub-
mitted as the court may direct. 10
All objections, whether in point of law or as to formal defects and ir-
regularities, must be raised by motion before filing an answering plead-
ing,1 ' but objections in point of law may be reserved in the answer or
subsequent pleading and raised on the trial.. 2  Failure to make timely
motion as to formal defects and irregularities, however, constitutes a waiver
and precludes subsequent objection on such matters. 1 3 Where the motion
is addressed to the pleading, it must raise all of the objections then exist-
ing," and the notice therefor must specify the particular defects objected
to."0 Where timely motion has been addressed to a pleading, the time
for filing a responsive pleading is extended during the pendency of the
motion and is fixed by the court in its order deciding the motion.n 6
Motions attacking jurisdiction and relating to matters in abatement.
To quash the summpns for lack of jurisdiction over the person. Lack of
jurisdiction over the person was raised at common law on special appear-
107. TIDD'S PRACTICO (3rd Am. ed. 1840) 694; 49 C. J. 362, § 452.
108. S. C. R. 39-41, 56.
109. On motions relating to matters in abatement, the judgment rendered
generally quashes the writ or dismisses the suit, whereas on motions tantamount
to a demurrer, it strikes out the complaint or other pleading. See Baldauf v.
Russell, 88 N. J. L. 303, 96 Atl. 96 (1915) ; and S. C. R. 40.
110. S. C. R. 56. See Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348, 91 Atl. 322 (1914).
Depositions may be taken before a justice, commissioner or examiner on 4 days'
written notice and with opportunity for cross-examination afforded. REV. STAT.
(1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 228; S. C. R. 191.
111. S. C. R. 30. Motions must be made on 2 days' written notice specifying
the grounds therefor. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 143, 144, 147; S. C. R.
43. See Dunn v. Chernewski, 101 N. J. L. 27, 127 Atl. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
112. S. C. R. 40, providing that the motion may be made before the trial
court which may determine such issue of law prior to trial on the merits on motion
of either party. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United Lead Co., 102 N. J. L. 545, 133
Atl. 290 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
113. S. C. R. 30, 39-41.
114. S. C. R. 42. Dunn v. Chernewski, 101 N. 3. L. 27, 127 Atl. 338 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
115. And matters not specified will not be heard. Rav. STAT. (1937) tit. 2,
c. 27, § 114; Dunn v. Chernewski, 101 N. 3. L. 27, 127 Atl. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1925);
Becker v. Kelsey, 9 N. J. Misc. 1265, 157 Atl. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
116. No rule or statute so provides, but in practice leave to answer over
or otherwise plead is granted, the court making such order as may be just.
S. C. R. 40; Central R. R. v. VanHorn, 38 N. J. L. 133, 140 (Sup. Ct. 1875).
But see Barenson v. Zaritsky, 11 N. J. Misc. 530, 167 Atl. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
1939]
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ance by demurrer or plea to the jurisdiction,1 7 in lieu of which a motion was
substituted by rule in 1912.118 The grounds on which the relief is granted,
however, remain the same, and a special appearance is necessary."n Where,
however, failure of jurisdiction occurs through defects in process, its is-
suance, return or service, the question is raised on special appearance by
motion to set aside the service of the summons and complaint, rather than
motion to quash. 20
To dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
This motion has replaced the common law plea to the jurisdiction or de-
murrer in cases where the defect was apparent.1 2 1 The objection may be
supported by affidavit or deposition if necessary. It cannot be waived and
may be pleaded in answer and raised on the trial.
22
Under the Transfer of Causes Act, a court may not dismiss the suit
on this ground where any other court of the state has jurisdiction over
the subject matter in question, but must transfer the cause to the proper
court, 23 though it be a court of chancery, 24 where subsequent proceedings
are thereafter taken as though the suit had originally been commenced
117. 49 C. J. 398, § 503; 1 C. J. 40, § 29 (demurrer); 1 C. J. S. 38, §§ 9
et seq. (plea).
118. S. C. R. 40, 56.
119. The objection relates to immunity by reason of the status or peculiar
nature of defendant's person, e. g., foreign ambassadors, U. S. CoNST. Art. III,
§ 2, and foreign corporations not doing business in the state and without local
designee for receipt of process. McClelland v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co.,
10 N. J. Misc. 156, 158 Atl. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
120. The motion existed at common law, 50 C. J. 590, § 324. See also
Sweeney v. Miner, 88 N. J. L. 361, 95 Atl. 1014 (1915). But the court has broad
powers to correct defects in the summons, its issuance and service. REV. STAT.(1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 48, 63. In fact the court has power to order the issuance
and service of a new summons with the same effect as if served originally, even
though the statute of limitations has expired in the meantime. REV. STAT. (1937)
tit. 2, c. 27, § 63. See discussion in Martin v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 114 N. J. L.
243, 176 Atl. 665 (1935); but see Limpert Bros., Inc., v. Stitt, 94 N. J. L. 472,
110 Atl. 832 (1920); and Coventry v. Barrington, 117 N. J. L. 217, 187 Atl. 348(1936).
121. S. C. R. 40 and 56. As at common law, the movant must point to the
court within the state that has jurisdiction, unless no court within the state
will take cognizance of the suit. See Hill v. Nelson, 70 N. J. L. 376, 57 Atl. 411(Sup. Ct. 1904), and note 126, infra.
122. S. C. R. 40; King v. Scala, 110 N. J. L. 321, 165 Atl. 426 (Sup. Ct.
1933); Schaedel v. Liberty Trust Co., 99 N. J. L. 380, 123 Atl. 714 (1924).
123. This will be done at any stage of the proceeding, but the power is
limited to cases where the court has no jurisdiction. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2,
c. 26, § 60. See also S. C. R. 208, 209.
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there. 25 Of course, if no court in the state has jurisdiction, the action will
be dismissed. 26
To quash the summons on the ground that plaintiff has no capacity to
sue. This motion takes the place of the common law plea in abatement to
the person of plaintiff'17 and is properly brought where the plaintiff is a
fictitious person128 or where a legally existent person is not qualified to
sue. 29 The objection affects jurisdiction and is therefore not waived by
failure to move. 30
To dismiss the suit because a prior action is pending between the
parties for the same cause. At common law, this objection was raised by
plea in abatement or demurrer before pleading to the merits.' 3 ' It must
now be raised by motion in common with all of the former dilatory pleas.'
3 2
It is likewise waived unless taken before answer. 33
On the hearing, the movant must submit his proof by affidavit or
deposition of the commencement of the prior action, its pending status, the
identity of the parties, and the subject matter of the two actions. 34
Motions addressed to the complaint. Defects appearing on the face
of the complaint were formerly raised by demurrers, which were classified
as general or special.3 5 The general demurrer was used to test the suf-
ficiency of the complaint.in matters of substance, 38 whereas the special
125. Carey v. Brown, 92 N. J. Eq. 497, 113 AtI. 499 (Oh. 1921) (statute of
limitations expired before transfer).
126. Karr v. N. Y. Jewell Filtration Co., 78 N. J. L. 198, 73 Atl. 132 (Sup.
Ct. 1909); Hill v. Nelson, 70 N. J. L. 376, 57 Atl. 411 (Sup. Ct. 1904). But at
common law in such a case the proper plea was in bar, not in abatement. 49 C. J.
229, § 271.
127. 1 C. J. S. 129, § 92; 1 C. J. 116, § 185.
128. Baldauf v. Russell, 88 N. J. L. 303, 96 AtI. 96 (1915).
129. Such as a foreign corporation not authorized to do business, but the
corporation by subsequently qualifying may maintain the suit. Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Boyko, 103 N. J. L. 620, 137 Atl. 534 (1927).
130. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Boyko, 103 N. J. L. 620, 137 Atl. 534 (1927).
131. 1 C. J. S. 121, § 81b; 49 C. J. 387, § 488 (demurrer); 1 C. J. S. 119,
§ 81a (plea).
132. S.C. R. 56.
133. See HARRIS, PLEADING & PRACTICE IN NEw JERsEY (Rev. ed. 1939) § 278.
134. Hill v. Morrison, 46 N. J. L. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1884); Hixon v. Schooley, 26
N. J. L. 461 (Sup. Ct. 1857). Where a plaintiff is suing on a liquidated demand
which was available to him as a counterclaim or set-off when defendant in a
prior action, his failure to counterclaim or set-off as required by statute enables
the present defendant to make this motion to dismiss the second suit. REv. STAT.
(1937) tit. 2, c. 26, §§ 190, 191. See Schenck v. Schenck, 10 N. J. L. 276 (Sup.
Ct. 1829). Quaere: Is this not more in the nature of a plea in bar and hence
properly raised in the answer?
135. TInD'S PRACTICE (3rd Am. ed. 1840) 694.
136. 49 C. J. 363, § 454; and see Savage v. Pub. Service Ry., 95 N. J. L.
432, 113 Atl. 252 (1921).
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demurrer was limited to objections to form. 37 These special demurrers
were early abolished and replaced by motions to strike out the defective
complaint. 38 General demurrers, however, survived until 1912, when by
rule motions to strike were likewise substituted. 19 As in the case of the
dilatory pleas discussed above, the fundamental rules relating to common
law demurrers still apply to the motions by which defects in form and
substance are now raised. 40
To- strike out the complaint for defects and irregularities in form.
As pointed out above, objections to the form of the complaint must be
taken before answer; otherwise they are waived. 41 The rule defining such
objections reads: "Unnecessary repetition, prolixity, scandal, impertinence,
obscurity and uncertainty, and any other violation of the rules of pleading,
are respectively objectionable; also any pleading which is irregular, defec-
tive or so framed as to embarrass or delay a fair trial.' 1 42 Most of the
objections named in this rule are generally recognized in almost every
jurisdiction and do not need explanation here. The rule, however, includes
defects cognizable at common law, but not specifically mentioned, such as
duplicity, which arises where the plaintiff has confused or commingled
two or more causes of action in one count.V 43 The objection that matter
in the complaint will embarrass or delay a fair trial is by its terms so
broad as to include all of the other specific objections to form. It provides
a catch-all which the court may use to cover any peculiar situation which
may not fit into any well-defined category of objectionable matter.' 44 Leave
to amend may be granted to cure any of the foregoing defects.14
137. State v. Covenhoven, 6 N. J. L. 396, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1797); and see 49
C. J. 364, § 455.
138. P. L. 1855, p. 295, § 24; ComP. STAT. 4086, § 110, repealed by § 34 of
the Practice Act (1912), CoMiP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 163-310. At present
see S. C. R. 39, 41.
139. S. C. R. 40; Campbell v. The Pure Oil Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl.
873 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
140. Savage v. Pub. Ser. Ry., 95 N. J. L. 432, 113 Atl. 252 (1921); and see
Jamouneau Co. v. Wetherill, 98 N. J. L. 80, 118 Atl. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Lully
v. National Surety Co., 106 N. J. L. 81, 148 AtI. 762 (1930).
141. S. C. R. 30, 39-41.
142. S. C. R. 39. See also S. C. R. 48, re motion objecting to improper de-
mand for relief in complaint.
-143. Karnuff v. Kelch, 69 N. J. L. 499, 55 Atl. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1903), aff'd, 71
N. J. L. 558, 60 Atl. 364 (1905); Jackson v. Penn. R. R., 69 N. J. L. 79, 54 Atl.
532 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
144. See Malberti v. United Elec. Co., 69 N. J. L. 55, 54 AtI. 251 (Sup. Ct.
1903). Though the circumstances of the particular case will of course be de-
terminative of the motion, the moving party must show that actual prejudice will
result. Karpenski v. Bor. of South River, 83 N. J. L. 149, 83 Atl. 639 (Sup. Ct.
1912).
145. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 157. Also S. C. R. 31 (e).
[Vol. 4
21
Fintel: Fintel: Methods of Objecting to Pleadings
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PLEADINGS
To strike out a count of the complaint as superfluous. A defendant
may bring this motion to strike out a count of a complaint where the same
cause of action has been pleaded in several counts and where there appears
to be no substantial difference between them. 14 6 The objection is waived
unless taken by timely motion. "
To strike out the complaint for failure to disclose a cause of action.
This motion is tantamount to the common law general demurrer and is
made on the complaint for the purpose of raising a pure issue of law as
to its sufficiency in substance.148 It should be directed either to the whole
complaint or specific counts thereof. 49 Failure to disclose a cause of
action is not waived by failure to make timely motion. It may be pleaded
in the answer and raised before the trial court, which may on motion of
either party determine such issue of law prior to the trial on the facts.W 0
At common law, the form in which the action was brought was con-
sidered demurrable,'5 ' and while the Practice Act of 1912 abolished the
common law forms of action,5 2 it has been held by the New Jersey Court
of Errors and Appeals that "the essential and differentiating rules appli-
cable to pleading as established at common law still survive. "15 Mistaking
the remedy, however, need not be fatal, for the court may permit an
amendment though the substitution of a new cause of action may be
necessary.' 5 '
In 1928 the Practice Act was amended to provide for the striking of
sham and frivolous complaints. 5  This statute was further amended in
146. Rav. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 119; Adams v. Grady, 77 N. J. L. 301,
72 At. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
147. Before issue joined. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 119.
148. Harper v. Essex County Park Comm., 73 N. J. L. 1, 62 At. 384 (Sup.
Ct. 1905). Only facts well pleaded in the complaint may be considered and
deemed to be true, Campbell v. The Pure Oil Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 723, 194 At. 873
(Sup. Ct. 1937); but not if such facts are notoriously untrue, Giroud v. N. J.
Mfgrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 106 N. J. L. 238, 148 At. 790 (1930).
149. Malone v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 94 N. J. L. 347, 110
Atl. 696 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Introcasso v. Jasper, 10 N. J. Misc. 494, 159 Atl. 613
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
150. See note 112, supra.
151. Harper v. Essex County Park Comm., 73 N. J. L. 1, 62 AtI. 384 (Sup.
Ct. 1905); Wilkins v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N. J. L. 399, 59 Atl. 14 (Sup. Ct.1904). 1 ,7i _1777
152. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 7, providing that there shall be but one
form of action at common law, viz., an "action at law."
153. Minturn, J., in Ward v. Huff, 94 N. J. L. 81, 84, 109 AtI. 287, 288 (Sup.
Ct. 1920).
154. Rgv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 132. And see Rygiel v. Kanengieser,
114 N. J. L. 311, 176 Atl. 605 (1935).
155. P. L. 1928, c. 151, p. 306; REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 125, 129.
See Jaeger v. Naef, 112 N. J. L. 417, 171 Atl. 166 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
1939]
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1939], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW BEVIEW
1938 by substituting the phrase "insufficient in law" for the word "frivo-
lous, ' 15"' the two terms having become synonymous by interpretation, the
objection thereon being equivalent to a general demurrer.1 7 Though the
power to strike sham and frivolous pleadings has long been recognized at
common law, 1 8 this statute further permits the court to strike complaints
or counterclaims 8 0 or parts thereof which are sham or insufficient in law
with or without prejudice to the institution of another action on the same
cause of action.1 60  Furthermore, if it appear only probable that the
complaint or counterclaim is sham or insufficient in law, the plaintiff or
counterclaimant may be allowed to proceed on terms.''
If the court's decision on the motion is determinative of the whole
case, and the defects are incurable, judgment may be given as in the case
of a general demurrer ;162 otherwise, plaintiff may now be given leave to
amend. 6 3 If the motion is denied, the movant is then permitted to file
his answer, and the action proceeds as if no motion had been made. 1 4
To strike out the complaint for sham. Sham has been defined by the
courts as sufficient in law but palpably false. 65 As will be explained later,
a sham defense may be stricken and summary judgment entered in certain
actions. 60 Such summary judgment is not expressly available to a defend-
156. P. L. 1938, c. 189; Rav. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1938) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 125,
129.
157. See Comments on the Revised Statutes, REV. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1938)
p. xiv; Sculthorpe v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 98 N. J. L. 845, 121 Atl. '151
(1923); Hockenjos v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 16 N. J. Misc. 312, 199 Atl.
596 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Strictly speaking, "frivolousness" differs from "insufficient
in law" in the apparency of the defect, the insufficiency in the former being
obvious from mere inspection. Thus, one could demurrer after denial of motion
to strike for frivolousness. Key v. Paul, 61 N. J. L. 133, 38 Atl. 823 (Sup. Ct.
1897). Much confusion has developed as to the meaning of "sham" and
"frivolous," and whether they are mutually exclusive. See Boynton Lumber Co.
v. Evans, 101 N. 5. L. 120, 128 Atl. 180 (1925); Gee v. Independent Bonding
& Cas. Ins. Co., 109 N. J. L. 563, 162 Atl. 644 (1932).
158. Howe v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1849); Eday Fabrics, Inc.,
v. Seymour Dress Co., Inc., 116 N. J. L. 251, 183 Atl. 167 (1936).
159. See note 104, supra.
160. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 125, 127, 129. Quaere: Where the
complaint is stricken with prejudice, is this not tantamount to summary judg-
ment for defendant?
161. Rav. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 125.
162. S.C. R. 40.
163. TenEyck v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 19 N. J. L. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1842);
Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L. 72 (Sup. Ct. 1849).
164. Central R. R. v. VanHorn, 38 N. J. L. 133, 140 (Sup. Ct. 1875). But see
Barenson v. Zaritsky, 11 N. J. Misc. 530, 167 Atl. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
165. Jaeger v. Naef, 112 N. J. L. 417, 171 AtI. 166 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; 49 C. J.
84, § 82; Id. at 194, § 224.
166. See note 188, infra.
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ant,1 17 but as has been explained above with reference to the motion to
strike for failure to disclose a cause of action, he may, on a showing of
sham or probability thereof, strike the complaint, or require terms as a
condition to the further prosecution of the action.88 So, too, the court
may order that the striking of the complaint or a count thereof shall be
with prejudice to the institution of another action for the same cause. 6
The motion to strike for sham may be made on ex parte affidavits. 70
Motions addressed to the answer and subsequent pleadings. To strike
out an answer, reply or subsequent pleading as defective or irregular or
so framed as to prevent a fair trial. Defects in form such as for duplicity,
unnecessary repetition, uncertainty and obscurity, argumentiveness, or
presence of irrelevant matter may be raised on motion to strike out the
answer or subsequent pleading.1 7 1 The comment concerning parallel motions
addressed to the complaint is generally applicable here.172  Unless the
motion is made before filing a reply or responsive pleading, these defects
in form are waived,1 73 and even though timely objection is taken, leave
to amend may be granted.1 7 4
To strike out a defense as insufficient in law and for summary judg-
ment; to strike out matter in subsequent pleadings as insufficient in law.
The motion to strike for insufficiency in law is equivalent to the common
law general demurrer and is similar in operation to the corresponding
motion addressed to the complaint and is similarly limited to the face
of the pleadings. 7 5 As in the case of the demurrer it searches the record,
and the court examines the sufficiency of prior pleadings as well as the
pleading attacked and decides against the party first at fault.'
The court may strike out the particular defense or matter objected
167. But see note 160, supra.
168. Rsv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 125, 127, 129. See HARIUS, PLEADING
& PRACTICE IN Naw JERSEY (Rev. ed. 1939) 349.
169. REV. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 126.
170. S. C. R. 81-85. The motion will be denied if an issue of fact appears
from the affidavits submitted by both parties. Eday Fabrics, Inc. v. Seymour
Dress Co., Inc., 116 N. J. L. 251, 183 At. 167 (1936). And see note 190, infra.
171. Lindsey v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 10 N. J. Misc. 1275, 163 AtI. 245
(Sup. Ct. 1932); State ex rel. Wheeler v. Essex Pub. Rd. Bd., 40 N. J. L. 138
(Sup. Ct. 1878); Stults v. Buckelew, 28 N. J. L. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1859) (reply).
172. See p. 134, supra, and S. C. R. 39, 41.
173. By implication from S. C. R. 30, 39-41. See Salt Lake City Nat. Bank
v. Hendrickson, 40 N. J. L. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
174. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, §§ 157, 158.
175. See note 148, supra.
176. Rocker v. Cardinal B. & L. Ass'n, 13 N. J. Misc. 397, 179 AtI. 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), aff'd, 119 N. J. L. 134, 194 Atl. 865 (1937) (answer); Town of West-
field v. Pub. Ser. Ry., 84 N. J. L. 568, 87 Atl. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (reply).
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to or permit its amendment on terms,177 in which event the case may go
to trial on the amended defenses or on a denial or other sound defenses,
and in a proper case, the court may give final judgment.1 7 8
It is well established that a reply or subsequent pleading must be
consistent with the prior pleadings of the party; otherwise a departure
results, which may be similarly raised by motion to strike.170
The plaintiff may raise issues of law in his reply, if he prefers, in the
same manner as the defendant may raise similar issues in his answer.180
Where plaintiff is suing to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising
upon a contract, judgment or statute, he may, in addition to moving to
strike the answer as insufficient at law, request summary judgment in
his favor"' upon his affidavit verifying the cause of action and stating
the amount claimed and his belief that there is no defense to the action.182
Leave to defend may be granted unconditionally or conditionally in the
discretion of the court.183 Moreover, partial final summary judgment may
be granted for so much of plaintiff's claim as is admitted or left un-
contested.284
As compared to the summary judgment provisions in force in New
York, it is apparent that the summary relief available in New Jersey is
relatively narrow.18 The defendant has no right to move for summary
judgment, 88 nor may plaintiff do so in cases other than for liquidated
demands.18 7
To strike out a defense as sham and for summary judgment. In the
limited cases specified above with reference to defenses insufficient in law,
the plaintiff may likewise by the same rules and procedure obtain summary
judgment where defenses are sham, 88 unless the defendant by affidavit
177. Ru. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 157.
178. BEy. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 128. Gross v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 99
N. J. L. 414, 125 Atl. 110 (1924).
179. Holmes v. Seashore Elec. Ry., 57 N. J. L. 502, 31 Atl. 227 (Sup. Ct.
1895); Wilson v. Johnson, 29 Atl. 419 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
180. S. C. R. 40; Dalton v. City of Hoboken, 12 N. J. Misc. 216, 171 Atl. 141(Sup. Ct. 1934).
181. Buy. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 124; S. C. R. 80.
182. S. C. R. 81. See Katz v. Inglis, 109 N. J. L. 54, 160 Atl. 314 (1932).
183. Rv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 124; S. C. R. 83; Meyer v. Nickelsburg
Bros. Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 36 (Essex Circ. 1913).
184. Buv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 27, § 128; S. C. R. 82.
185. Compare New York R. C. P. 113.
186. But see quaere, note 160, supra.
187. See S. C. R. 80.
188. S. C. R. 80-84. Eisele & King v. Raphael, 90 N. J. L. 219, 101 Atl. 200(1917); and see Coykendall v. Robinson, 39 N. J. E. 98 (1876), re striking sham
general denial or plea of general issue.
[Vol. 4
25
Fintel: Fintel: Methods of Objecting to Pleadings
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PLEADINGS
or other proof shows facts which in the court's discretion entitle him to
defend.180 As was explained in the New York discussion, if plaintiff's and
defendant's affidavits are contradictory, the motion will be denied, for
the court will not try an issue of fact on affidavits. 190
CONNECTICUT
This discussion must be read with certain underlying factors in mind.
Practically every Connecticut lawyer, and a surprising number of informed
lawyers of adjacent states, feel that in Connecticut the practice of the
law is as near utopian as it may be in this age. Judges are of the highest
calibre and are in a sense the English type of career judges. Their tenure
is secure, seniority is recognized, and members of the Connecticut Supreme
Court are chosen from the ranks of superior court judges, usually the
senior judge. The superior court judges' assignments take them to all the
counties so they soon know all the lawyers in the state, which is invaluable
if and when that judge sits on the supreme court. The bar is small, and,
with the exception of a few, the members do not misstate, misrepresent,
or lie to each other or the court, nor do they wilfully indulge in dilatory
tactics.
The practice and procedure is provided by statutes and court rules'9 '
which do not supersede the common law, much of which still controls
procedure, but merely introduces a new system to make the ancient system
more convenient.'92
Briefly the methods of attacking pleadings are as follows:
189. S. C. R. 80. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Chausmer, 120 N. J. L. 208,
198 Atl. 828 (1938); No-Worry Chemical Co. v. Du-All Chemical Co., 16 N. J.
Misc. 99, 197 Atl. 364 (1938). Plaintiff's affidavits must comply with all of the
requirements of S. C. R. 81. Meyer v. Nickelsburg Bros., 37 N. J. L. J. 36
(Essex Circ. 1913). If they do not controvert the facts alleged in the defense
attacked as sham, defendant need not file answering affidavits. Harley v.
Passaic County, 121 N. J. L. 44, 1 At. (2d) 454 (1938).
190. Meserole Securities Co. v. Dintenfass, 108 N. J. L. 298, 156 Atl. 465
(1931); No-Worry Chemical Co. v. Du-All Chemical Co., 16 N. J. Misc. 99, 197
Atl. 364 (1938).
191. Contained respectively in Connecticut General Statutes of 1930, and
in an official publication entitled CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK (1934), hereafter
cited as P. B.
192. Hunter's Appeal, 71 Conn. 189, 41 Atl. 557 (1898).
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I. Objections to the Complaint.
A. Pleas in abatement or to the jurisdiction.1 9 3
B. Motion to strike out.194
C. Motion for more specific statement. 195
D. Motion to expunge.19
6
E. Motion for misjoinder of parties.1 97
F. Demurrer.19 8
II. Objections to the answer.1 99
A. Motion to strike out.20 0
B. Motion for more specific statement.20 '




III. Motion for summary judgment.204
Despite the availability of the foregoing methods of objecting to
pleadings, pleas in abatement are distinctly disfavored, 200 and the motions
to correct the pleadings and motions for summary judgment are used
very little.2 0 This may result from calendars being up to date and the
extreme good faith existing between members of the Bench and Bar.20 7
193. CONN. GENm. STAT. (1930) § 5506; P. B. § 83.
194. P. B. § 61.
195. P. B. § 62; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5513.
196. P. B. § 63; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5515.
197. P. B. § 65.
198. P. B. §§ 97, 98. "All defenses, other than those to the jurisdiction or
in abatement, shall be made by an answer or by a demurrer." GEN. STAT. (1930)
§ 5506. All demurrers must be special. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5507.
199. For the nature of denials, see GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5508, and P. B.
§ 104.
200. P. B. § 61.
201. P. B. § 62; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5513.
202. P. B. § 63; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5515.
203. P. B. §§ 97, 98; GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5506, 5507.
204. P. B. §§ 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.
205. Budd, Adm'r v. Meriden Elect. R. R., 69 Conn. 272, 37 At. 683 (1897);
Brockett v. Fair Haven & W. R. R., 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 763 (1900).
206. CLARK AND SHULMAN, LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937)
51, 216-219.
207. Although some statutory and court rule coercion may exist from the
seldom used P. B. §§ 82, 122, and GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5514, 5674, which in
effect provide that a defendant's attorney file at any time the plaintiff requests
a writing signed by him stating whether he honestly believes there is a bona fide
defense to plaintiff's action, what the substance of the defense is, and that
the defense will be made. It provides a speedy, informal way of probing the
conscience of the defendant's attorney. All the court passes on, however, is the
attorney's good faith, not whether a defense is legally sufficient. Jennings v.
Parsons, 71 Conn. 413, 42 Atl. 76 (1898); Nichols v. Ansonia, 81 Conn. 229, 70
Atl. 636 (1908). If after the case is over it is disclosed that untrue pleadings
or a false statement concerning a defense has been made, reasonable expenses
(Vol.
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Plea in abatement or to the jurisdiction. The office of a plea in abate-
ment is to set up facts which otherwise would not be apparent to the court
and to pray for the benefit of some legal conclusion therefrom.' 8 Gener-
ally, the common law pleas in abatement are available,20 9 but the statutes,
contrary to common law, provide for the filing of one plea in which excep-
tions to the jurisdiction of the court and grounds of abatement may be
set forth.
210
The practice is to file a plea in abatement or to the jurisdiction which
clearly states facts not of record 1 in such specific detail that no doubt
exists, as to the ground on which the defendant excepts to the jurisdiction
or contends the action should abate, for these pleas cannot be aided by
intendment or inference. 2
The issues of fact thus raised by the plea are then tried, but the
determination by the court does not preclude the parties from contesting
the case on its merits, for the defendant may plead over or the plaintiff
may amend.213 If facts showing lack of jurisdiction are not apparent on
the record, attack must be made by plea, but if such facts are apparent
from the record, the remedy is a motion to erase the case from the
docket.214
While ordinarily a plea in abatement does not go to the substance of
the case,2 5 and thus may be waived if not taken within the time speci-
fied,216 it is certainly clear that a. plea to the jurisdiction of the court
and double costs may be taxed, and an attorney making intentional or reckless
false statements is subject to suspension.
208. O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 AtI. 777 (1906). If the ground of
abatement is solely one of law, the plea must be so framed as to raise clearly
the issue of law. Sanford v. Bacon, 75 Conn. 541, 54 Atl. 204 (1903).
209. P. B. 250, although of course the statutes control. Southey v. Dowling,
70 Conn. 153, 39 Atl. 113 (1897).
210. Leventhal Furn. Co., Inc. v. Crescent Furn. Co., Inc., 121 Conn. 343,
184 Atl. 878 (1936).
211. Sisk v. Meagher, 82 Conn. 483, 74 AtI. 880 (1909).
212. Budd, Adm'r v. Meriden Elect. R. R., 69 Conn. 272, 37 Atl. 683 (1897).
See also Miller v. Cross, 73 Conn. 538, 48 Atl. 213 (1901) ; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.
v. Illy, 79 Conn. 526, 65 Atl. 965 (1907).
213. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5537, 5538.
214. Williams Co. v. Mairs, 72 Conn. 430, 44 Atl. 729 (1899); Sisk v.
Meagher, 82 Conn. 483, 74 Atl. 880 (1909).
215. Rogers v. Hendrick, 85 Conn. 260, 82 Atl. 586 (1912).
216. P. B. § 85. The day following the return day of the writ. Writs are
returnable the first Tuesday of each month except July and August, but must
be served twelve days before; otherwise they are returnable the first Tuesday
of the following month; or before any subsequent pleading is filed. P. B. § 84.
But of course the court may by order grant time. P. B. § 86.
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over the subject matter is never waived,217 and may be raised by the court
suo moto.2 18 With this exception, there is little chance of error in this
jurisdiction regarding the waiving of rights to file or to object to any
pleading, for the order of pleas, motions, demurrers, etc., is specified, and
the filing of any pleading, which term here includes any pleading, plea,
motion or demurrer, waives the right to file any prior pleading unless the
court orders otherwise. 219 Because of its clarity this subject will not be
mentioned again under the various motions.
As pleas in abatement are not looked upon with favor by the courts,
amendments of pleas are granted sparingly,220 although ordinarily amend-
ments of defective pleadings are quite liberally permitted.221
Motion to strike out. This motion provides for the striking out or
removing from the record of an entire pleading or motion which is sham,
frivolous, improperly filed, or unfit because of indecent or scandalous
allegations.22 It has been held this is a "rarely available remedy" and
does not overlap a motion to expunge or a demurrer. 23  The motion lies
only where the defect is clearly apparent on the face of the pleadings.
2 24
The entire pleading must be palpably and clearly bad for the reasons
specified. 225
217. Marcil v. Merriman & Sons, Inc., 115 Conn. 678, 163 Atl. 411 (1932);
Woodmont Ass'n v. Milford, 85 Conn. 517, 84 Atl. 307 (1912)'.
218. Whitehead v. Roberts, 86 Conn. 351, 85 Atl. 538 (1912).
219. See the order listed in P. B. §§ 83, 84. For example, filing an answer
would waive abatable defects, Tracy v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 1,
72 At. 156 (1909); and the right to demurrer, Ohlin v. Kowner, 96 Conn. 394,
114 Ati. 117 (1921); and certain jurisdictional defects as court's jurisdiction
over the person, Lusas v. Church Corp., 123 Conn. 166, 193 At. 204 (1937);
and the right to a more specific statement, Kearns v. Widman, 94 Conn. 257,
108 At. 661 (1919); or the right to have matter expunged, Dawson v. Orange,
78 Conn. 96, 61 Atl. 101 (1905); and in fact any defects raised by motion,
Brown v. Woodward, 75 Conn. 254, 53 Ati. 112 (1902); and it withdraws a
pending demurrer, Jackson v. Savage, 79 Conn. 294, 64 Atl. 737 (1906); al-
though a pleading may be filed after the time has expired by obtaining a court
order or consent of the opposing party, P. B. §§ 84, 86, GEN. STAT. (1930) §§
5533, 5534. All defects then existing must be raised at one time. P. B. § 64.
220. Brockett v. Fair Haven & W. R. R., 73 Conn. 428, 47 AtI. 763 (1900).
221. Bennett v. United Lumber & Supply Co., 114 Conn. 614, 159 Ati. 572
(1932); Clayton v. Clayton, 115 Conn. 683, 163 AtI. 458 (1932); GEN. STAT.
(1930) §§ 5510, 5537, 5538. And pleading after amenament is of course per-
mitted. P. B. § 95.
222. P. B. § 61.
223. Donovan v. Davis, 85 Conn. 394, 82 Atl. 1025 (1912).
224. Equitable Trust Co. v. Plume, 92 Conn. 649, 103 At. 940 (1918). If not
apparent on the face, the remedy would be a plea in abatement.
225. For example, interposing a tort counterclaim in a contract action,
Schaefer v. 0. K. Tool Co., Inc., 110 Conn. 528, 148 Atl. 330 (1930); or where
a pleading contains only legal conclusions, Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. Manchester,
89 Conn. 671, 96 Atl. 182 (1915), or where a writ was filed without ever serving
a complaint, although the court said a motion to erase the entire case from the
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Motion for a more specific statement. Where the pleadings do nbt
fully disclose the ground of the claim or defense, the adverse party may
move for a more particular statement specifying the particulars desired
and the grounds of his motion.22 The motion is available to parties to
enable them to protect themselves from surprise at the trial,227 and as
such would seem to be equivalent to a motion for a bill of particulars,
which motion is ordinarily only available if a complaint designated the
"common counts" is filed. 228 The power to order a more specific statement
under this motion, which has a counterpart in most jurisdictions, is here,
however, exercised cautiously and only for substantial reasons. 229
Motion to expunge. This is the typical motion to strike out parts of
a pleading which are unnecessary, repetitious, prolix, scandalous, imperti-
nent, obscure, uncertain, irrelevant, immaterial, or evidential. 230 It has
been said its use should be avoided by the profession and discouraged by
the trial court.231 The motion cannot be used to whittle away a pleading,
hoping to make it demurrable.2 3 2 While strange, it has been held that
expunged matter remained in the files and "could have been utilized as
docket was more appropriate, but served the same purpose as a motion to strike
out, Galvin v. Birch, 97 Conn. 399, 116 Atl. 908 (1922); or where a substituted
complaint does not obviate defects of a previous complaint held bad on demurrer,
Oefinger v. Dalton, 116 Conn. 720, 165 Atl. 351 (1933). It would seem from the
last two cases that motions to strike out and motions to erase a pleading from
the court files are in effect the same.
226. P. B. § 62; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5513, under which the usual motion
to state and number separately may be made.
227. Huber v. Douglas, Inc., 94 Conn. 167, 108 Atl. 727 (1919). A more
specific statement of damages may be had, Matysewski v. Wheeler, 97 Conn. 593,
117 AtI. 545 (1922); or specification of acts of negligence relied on, Doerr v.
Woodland Transportation Co., 105 Conn. 689, 136 Atl. 693 (1927). While not a
motion objecting to a pleading, there is also available a motion for disclosure,
P. B. §§ 72-77, the purpose of which is to obtain facts exclusively in the possession
of the opposite party which are material to the support of the mover's cause of
action or defense.
228. P. B. § 30; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5527. However, such a common count
complaint is in itself insufficient in law, if no supplemental complaint or bill
of particulars is served; so its only real effect seems to be to give a plaintiff
more time, Dunnett v. Thornton, 73 Conn. 1, 46 Atl. 158 (1900).
229. Prince v. Takash, 75 Conn. 616, 54 Atl. 1003 (1903).
230. P. B. § 63; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5515.
231. Donovan v. Davis, 85 Conn. 394, 82 Atl. 1025 (1912); Bitello v. Lipson,
80 Conn. 497, 69 Atl. 21 (1908). It has a very limited function if based
solely on immateriality or irrelevancy. State v. Erickson, 104 Conn. 542, 133 Atl.
683 (1926). It does not determine substantial rights, Whitney v. Cady, 71 Conn.
166, 41 Atl. 550 (1898); or prevent one from stating his case in his own way,
so long as issues are not clouded, Freeman's Appeal, 71 Conn. 708, 43 Atl.
185 (1899).
232. Frisbie, Adm'r v. Preston, 67 Conn. 448, 35 Atl. 278 (1896); Burritt
v. Lunny, 90 Conn. 491, 97 Atl. 756 (1916).
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evidence, '23 3 presumably, however, as evidence of an admission in the
pleadings.
Motion for misjoinder of parties. The exclusive remedy for misjoinder
of parties is by motion. However, neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of
parties is a ground for a plea in abatement of an action,23 4 although the
proper remedy for nonjoinder is a demurrer.2 3 5
Demurrer. The demurrer is the only manner in which the sufficiency
of a cause of action or defense may be tested before trial. It must be to
an entire cause of action or to an entire or partial defense and must
distinctly specify the reason for the alleged insufficiency, 2 0 and the
grounds are generally the same as at common law. "Speaking Demurrers"
are not countenanced as the pleading is tested solely on its own allega-
tions.237 If a defendant fails to plead over after his demurrer is overruled,
final judgment may be entered against him, but he should appeal from
this judgment and not the respondeas ouster.238 If he does plead over,
that is not a waiver of his right to appeal from the decision on the
demurrer. 2 9 Prior to trial, no procedure exists for obtaining judgment
on the pleadings.
Summary Judgment. This remedy is available to a plaintiff by motion
in any action to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money arising
out of certain limited types of actions, 240 i. e., negotiable instruments;
contracts, except quasi contracts; judgments; statute; guaranty; and
233. Nat. Transportation Co., Inc., v. Toquet, 123 Conn. 468, 196 Atl. 344
(1937); and see Theron Ford Co. v. Dudley, 104 Conn. 519, 133 Atl. 746 (1926).
234. P. B. § 65; GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5522; Montgomery v. Branford, 107
Conn. 697, 142 Atl. 574 (1928). And additional parties may be summoned in by
the court. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5521.
235. Andover's Appeal, 113 Conn. 494, 155 AtI. 717 (1931).
236. P. B. §§ 97, 98; GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5506, 5507. If a demurrer to one
cause of action or defense is sustained, such cause of action or defense is removed
from the case, unless it is also applicable to another cause of action or defense.
P. B. § 99. The remedy for misjoinder of causes of action is by demurrer, P. B.
§ 100, although such defects are waived if not seasonably taken. P. B. § 101.
237. In re Bedard v. Cunneen, 111 Conn. 338, 149 Atl. 890 (1930).
238. Denton v. Danbury, 48 Conn. 368, 372 (1880); O'Donnell v. Sargent &
Co., 69 Conn. 476, 38 AtI. 216 (1897).
239. Mechanics Bank v. Woodward, 74 Conn. 689, 51 Atl. 1084 (1902).
240. P. B. § 52. See Appendix for the complete list of actions in which the
motion may be made. For discussion of the statutory sections, see Clark, The
New Summary Judgment Rule in Connecticut (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 82. The
procedure apparently is used very little in Connecticut. See CLARK AND SHUL-
MAN, LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937) 51, which is a statistical
survey. It would appear from this study that all the motions addressed to plead-
ings discussed above are used very little in Connecticut, for there seems to be a
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certain equitable actions for recovery of chattels, to quiet title, or dis-
charge certain liens.
The plaintiff, any time after the defendant has appeared, may file a
motion with supporting affidavits by himself or anyone having personal
knowledge, verifying the cause of action and the sum he believes to be
due, and that the defendant has no defense; whereupon, the defendant
must, by replying affidavit, show such facts as may be deemed by the
court sufficient to entitle him to defend. If the defendant's affidavit is
insufficient, frivolous, or false, or for the purpose of delay, the court may
strike it from the court files. If the defense applies only to part of the
claim, the plaintiff may have final judgment for part, and the action
will be severed and proceeded with as to the remainder of the claim.241
It is to be noted that only the plaintiff may obtain summary judgment.
Questions of law cannot be decided on the motion, but must await the
finding by the court that the defendant has no defense on the facts, and
thereupon the defendant may fie an appropriate pleading to test the
question of law. If he fails to file such a pleading, the plaintiff may have
judgment. As a denial of the motion is considered interlocutory, no
appeal lies from such an order.
PENNSYLVANIA
In this jurisdiction a plaintiff's first pleading is called the plaintiff's
statement of claim. The defendant files an affidavit of defense thereto
which may contain a set-off, counterclaim or new matter, whereupon the
plaintiff's reply is filed and the pleadings are closed. A rule in Pennsylvania
is in the nature of an order to show cause granted by the court upon mo-
tion or petition of a party.
The methods of raising objections to pleadings may be classified as
follows:
I. Motions addressed to the plaintiff's statement of claim.242
A. Motion to strike off.243
241. P. B. §§ 53, 54.
242. Plaintiff has similar remedies against the defendant's set-off, counter-
claim, or new matter. Practice Act (1915) § 15 (which is really only a pleading
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B. Rule for more specific statement.2 4 4
0. Statutory demurrer. 245
IH. Motions addressed to defendant's affidavit of defense.240
A. Motion to strike off.247
B. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. "48
Motion to strike off. This motion is available against any pleading 249
which fails to comply with the requirements particularly specified by the
practice act.' It attacks only the defects in form; no errors in substance
may be raised. 251 If the motion is not made within fifteen days after service
of the statement of claim and before an affidavit of defense on the merits
is served, the defects are waived.25 2
244. This rule, obtained on petition of the defendant, is not provided for
in the Practice Act of 1915, but was in use prior to the act. Bradly v. Potts,
155 Pa. 418, 26 Atl. 734 (1893). And it has been held that the remedy under
the old procedure is therefore still effective and available. Rhodes v. Terheyden,
272 Pa. 397, 116 At. 364 (1922).
245. While all common law pleas and demurrers have been abolished by
§§ 3 and 4 of the Practice Act, § 3 provides that "defenses heretofore raised
by these pleas shall be made in the affidavit of defense," and § 20 provides that
a defendant may raise any question of law in his affidavit of defense without
answering the averments of fact in the statement of claim, and any question of
law so raised may be set down for a hearing and disposed of by the court. It
is important at the outset to notice that an affidavit of defense raising ques-
tions of law is a statutory demurrer as distinguished from a true affidavit of
defense answering on the merits the averments of facts in the plaintiff's state-
ment of claim.
246. Defendant has similar remedies against plaintiff's reply to defendant's
set-off, counterclaim, or new matter. § 15.
247. § 21.
248. § 17. This rule also provides that the defendant may move for judg-
ment against a plaintiff for want of a reply or sufficient reply to the whole or
any part of the defendant's set-off, counterclaim, or new matter. It seems
the defendant's affidavit of defense is not subject to a rule for a more specific
statement, for if it violates the formal requirements of the statutes, plaintiff may
move to strike it off, and if it is not specific and definite, it is insufficient and
subject to a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
249. Affidavit of defense is stricken if defective in form. Fleck-Marshil v.
Lamparter, 12 D. & C. 113 (1928).. Defective counterclaim or set-off may be
stricken. Riling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472, 140 Atl. 270 (1928). ("The form of reply
and the law applicable to determine its sufficiency will be like that of the affidavit
of defense"). AMRAM, COMMON PLEAS PRACTICE (1936) 106; Smith v. Faust, 92
Pa. Super. 267 (1928).
250. For example, failure to allege if contract is oral or in writing. § 9;
Gilmer Bros. v. Walker, 29 D. R. 510 (1919); but an amendment will be allowed,
Manolakis v. Am. Ex. Co., 9 D. & C. 454 (1927). Claim is stricken if not sworn
to, Minnick v. Denny, 1 D. & C. 120 (1921); also if prolix, Ritchey v. Pratto,
4 D. & C. 188 (1923); but a prolix affidavit of defense is not stricken if plain-
tiff is not injured thereby, Rumsey v. Keystone, 14 D. & C. 291 (1930).
251. Sovich v. Reading Co., 10 D. & C. 194 (1928). Some courts require
supporting affidavits, but this seems unnecessary.
252. § 21. Cameron v. Fishman, 291 Pa. 12, 139 Atl. 383 (1927); Lutz v.
Tamaqua, 1 D. & C. 746 (1922). Filing a statutory demurrer is also a waiver.
Martin v. Hertzler, 9 D. & C. 321 (1927).
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Rule for more specifie statement. This rule is available where a state-
ment of claim,25 3 set-off or counterclaim, 25 4 or new matter255 is good in form
and sets forth a good cause of action and complies with the statutory re-
quirements relating thereto, but is nevertheless not detailed or specific
enough in its allegations of fact.25 6 This motion and a statutory demurrer
are not interchangeable. 25 7 Actually, the motion elicits information former-
ly obtainable in a bill of particulars which is now obsolete, for under the
practice act a statement of claim must be so specific that it has been held
every statement of claim, and answer embodies within it a bill of particu-
lars.218
The right to move for a more specific statement is waived if an answer
on the merits is filed, or trial is begun,2 9 even though amendments of
pleadings are permitted quite freely. 260 A pleader is penalized if he fails
to move to strike off or obtain a rule for a more specific statement by being
prevented from objecting at the trial to the admission of evidence under
and substantiating the general indefinite averments. 21
Statutory Demurrer. While Section 4 of the practice act abolishes
demurrers, the same Section provides that "questions of law heretofore
raised by demurrer shall be raised in the affidavit of defense as provided
in section twenty." Hence, the statutory demurrer is only a substitute for
253. Duggan v. Duggan, 291 Pa. 556, 140 At. 342 (1928).
254. Riling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472, 140 AtI. 270 (1928).
255. Gehret v. M. B. S. C., 120 Pa. Super. 198, 182 Atl. 125 (1935).
256. Duggan v. Duggan, 291 Pa. 556, 140 At. 342 (1928), where the court
stated that the defendant should first decide if the statement of claim complies
with the relevant statutes, and if not, he should move to strike it off. If the
statement does conform to the statutes but is not sufficiently specific, he should
take "a Rule for a more specific statement and follow it by a motion for a non-
pros, if the Rule were made absolute and not complied with." (A non-pros is an
involuntary dismissal of the action without prejudice. It is not a final judgment
on the merits, although it might become that if the Statute of Limitations has
run on a new action.)
257. Bradly v. Potts, 155 Pa. 418, 26 Atl. 734 (1893); Franklin Sugar Re-
fining Co. v. Lykens Merc. Co., 274 Pa. 206, 117 AtI. 780 (1922).
258. King v. Brillhart, 271 Pa. 301, 114 Atl. 515 (1921). See also, Daveler v.
Fisher, 16 D. & C. 601 (1931); A=MAM, COMMON PLEAs PRACTICE (1936) 82.
The old decisions on granting or refusing motions for bills of particulars govern
decisions on rules for more specific statements. Commonwealth v. Firemen's
Fund, 23 D. & C. 618 (1934). Where the rule is made absolute, i. e., the party
taking it has put it down for argument and it is sustained, an amended pleading
may be filed; if the order of the court is not complied with, a motion for non-
pros may be made. Duggan v. Duggan, 291 Pa. 556, 140 Atl. 342 (1928).
259. King v. Brillhart, 271 Pa. 301, 114 Atl. 515 (1921).
260. § 21. Raskus v. Allegheny Valley St. Ry., 302 Pa. 34, 153 Atl. 117
(1930); Tigoni v. B. & 0. R. R., 116 Pa. Super. 117, 176 Atl. 830 (1935).
261. Lynch v. Bornot, 120 Pa. Super. 242, 182 Ati. 49 (1935); Nark v. Hor-
ton Motor Lines, Inc., 331 Pa. 550, 1 Atl. (2d)-655 (1938).
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the common law demurrer.262 It is important to note that the statutory
demurrer is raised by an affidavit of defense specifying the ground on
which the defendant contends the statement of claim is insufficient in law
and praying for a hearing and disposition of the question of law so taised,
and as such affidavit of defense is a true pleading, the defendant need
file no other pleading until it is disposed of by the court. 2 3 Like a de-
murrer, it attacks defects appearing on the face of the pleading, and no
facts delors the pleading may be considered.214
The court may sustain a demurrer as to the whole or a part of a plain-
tiff's statement of claim.2"5 However, judgment for the defendant is only
granted in clear cases where the defect in plaintiff's statement of claim
cannot be amended.26  While thus in clear cases the defendant may obtain
judgment, the court cannot give judgment against the defendant, for if
the statutory demurrer is overruled, the defendant has an absolute right
to file within fifteen days a supplemental affidavit of defense, 2 7 and as
the order overruling the demurrer is interlocutory, no appeal may be
taken.2
68
262. Winters v. Pennsylvania R. R., 304 Pa. 243, 155 Atl. 486 (1931) ; Miller
v. Lochman, 15 D. & C. 91 (1931); Kochersperger v. Bank, 16 D. & C. 263 (1930).
Where a plaintiff pleads a good cause of action but no proper allegations of
damage, statutory demurrer is sustainable. Sabiston v. Sabiston, 299 Pa. 448,
149 Atl. 700 (1930). But if there is an erroneous measure of damages alleged,
the proper remedy would be for the defendant to move to strike off plaintiff's
claim or file a rule for a more specific statement. Casella v. Valenti, 17 D. & C.
603 (1932).
263. Carbo-Hydrogen Co. v. White, 34 Dauph. 129 (1930). The plaintiff
should set the demurrer down for hearing and should not file a reply. Vonder-
smith v. Urban, 108 Pa. Super. 103, 165 Atl. 62 (1933).
264. Steel v. Levy, 282 Pa. 338, 127 Atl. 766 (1925); Vondersmith v. Urban,
108 Pa. Super. 103, 165 Atl. 62 (1933); Cameron v. Fishman, 291 Pa. 12, 139 Atl.
383 (1927).
265. Com. v. Cons. Indemnity & Ins. Co., 107 Pa. Super. 535, 164 Atl. 78
(1933). The demurrer may be sustained as to some or dismissed as to other
defendants. Schuster v. Largman, 318 Pa. 26, 178 Atl. 45 (1935).
266. All facts and reasonable inferences as alleged in the plaintiff's state-
ment of claim are deemed true, Troop v. Franklin Say. & Trust Co., 291 Pa. 18,
139 AtI. 492 (1927) ; but no inferences or conclusions of law are admitted, Com-
monwealth ex rel. Davis v. Blume, 307 Pa. 406, 161 Atl. 551 (1932) ; and judg-
ment for the defendant is not permitted where the defect in plaintiff's statement
of claim may be amended, Seaman v. Tamaqua Nat. Bank, 280 Pa. 124, 124 Atl.
323 (1924) ; the court must give the pleader a chance to amend, Winters v. Penn.
R. R., 304 Pa. 243, 155 AtI. 486 (1931). The test for granting judgment against
the plaintiff was stated in Rhodes v. Terheyden, 272 Pa. 397, 116 Atl. 364 (1922),
as being "not whether the statement is so clear, in both form and specification,
as to entitle plaintiff, without amendment, to proceed to trial, but whether, upon
the facts averred, it shows, as a 'question of law,' that plaintiff is not entitled
to recover . . . the doubt should be resolved against entering summary judg-
ment, the power so to do being intended only for clear cases . "
267. § 20. Shifferstine v. Sitler, 264 Pa. 290, 107 Atl. 686 (1919); Com-
monwealth v. Auto Banking Corp., 104 Pa. Super. 369, 157 Atl. 333 (1931).
268. In re Love's App., 99 Pa. Super. 150 (1930).
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Although the right to file a statutory demurrer is waived by the filing
of an affidavit of defense on the merits by the defendant, the defendant is
not precluded from pointing out insufficiencies in the statement of claim,
if the plaintiff subsequently moves for judgment for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense.269
Ride for Judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. Ex-
cluding the default provisions, Section 17 provides in contract, not tort,
actions2 70 for very limited summary relief. Briefly, the Section permits
the testing by rule of the sufficiency in law of the affidavit of defense of the
defendant or reply of the plaintiff to defendant's set-off, counterclaim or
new matter. To succeed, plaintiff's statement of claim must set forth a
self-sustaining, legally sufficient cause of action, which would entitle the
plaintiff to a verdict for the full amount of his claim."- It is not clear
when no counterclaim is interposed, whether the motion "searches the
record," despite the court's talk of "judgment on the pleadings," "sum-
mary judgment" and that the defendant has not waived his right to attack
plaintiff's statement of claim for insufficiency when the plaintiff attacks
his affidavit of defense. 272 In any event, it is clear the plaintiff may, under
certain circumstances, by this motion, obtain the dismissal of the defend-
ant's affidavit of defense. Like a statutory demurrer, which it really is,
it is granted only in clear cases,2 73 and is determined upon the facts set
269. Fuller v. Stewart Coal Co., 27 D. R. 512, 514 (1917)-; Reinhardt v.
B. & L. Ass'n, 120 Pa. Super. 539, 182 Atl. 750 (1936).
270. § 17; Schanne v. Bioren, 100 Pa. Super. 76 (1930).
271. Commonwealth v. Magee, 24 Pa. Super. 329 (1904), where because
plaintiff's statement was not sufficiently clear, judgment was denied.
272. See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929) 38 YALE
L. J. 423, 462, where it is said that Pennsylvania's § 17 provides only for default
judgments. It is believed that this is inaccurate, for not only may a plaintiff
obtain judgment if a defendant fails to file an affidavit of defense, but the plain-
tiff may obtain judgment if the affidavit of defense filed by the defendant is,
upon test under this section, found to be on its face insufficient in law. In Parry
v. First Nat. Bank of Lansford, 270 Pa. 556, 113 Atl. 847 (1921), the court says,
"The filing of the affidavit constituted no waiver of defendant's right subsequently
to rely upon the inadequacy of plaintiff's averments, when the latter asked forjudgment on the pleadings." See also Irwin v. Weikel, 282 Pa. 259, 127 Atl. 612
(1925); Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 AtI. 377
(1933). In Taggart v. DeFillippo, 315 Pa. 438, 173 Atl. 423 (1934), it was held
that the appellate court could of its own volition reverse a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff because of the inadequacy of his statement and send back the
record with a procedendo. The motion is not truly one for judgment on the
pleadings, since it does not condemn the first bad pleading, nor does § 17 provide
typical summary judgment relief, for no affidavits are permitted to show facts
dehors the pleadings and so at best it is an attempt to provide relief against
defensive pleading, which is, on its face, insufficient in law.
273. Armstrong v. Connelly, 299 Pa. 51, 149 Atl. 87 (1930).
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forth in the record and without affidavits. 274  The motion is brought after
the defendant files his affidavit of defense on the merits, and the allegations
of fact contained in the affidavit of defense are deemed true.275
The test laid down by the court seems to be that the plaintiff is en-
titled to judgment "only when the affidavit of defense clearly presents no
meritorious defense; nevertheless, when the affidavit does not present a
legal defense to plaintiff's claim, judgment should be summarily entered
in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.1 2 0
An appeal may be taken from the order refusing to grant judgment
for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.277 This motion may be made at
any time and is never waived.
Attack on Set-off, Counterclaim or New Matter. These, if defective,
are subject to attack by motion to strike off, or by rule for a more specific
statement of set-off or counterclaim, or by plaintiff's reply in the nature of
a statutory demurrer to the set-off or counterclaim.28  The sufficiency
of the set-off or counterclaim may also be raised on a motion for judgment
for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.27 9
It appears that where an affidavit of defense contains a set-off, counter-
claim, or new matter, a motion for judgment by the defendant against the
plaintiff for want of a sufficient reply to the whole or any part of the set-
off, counterclaim, or new matter is a broader motion than any other motion
permitted under present Pennsylvania practice, for under Section 17 of the
practice act the court may enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff or the
defendant for such amount as may be found due, with leave to proceed for
the balance, or such other judgment as justice may require. The filing of
a reply within fifteen days, as required by statute, cannot be considered
a waiver of the right to attack a set-off, counterclaim, or new matter. 80
There are many variations of the relief which may be granted if an affidavit
274. Kramer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Pa. Super. 572, 176 At. 744 (1935).
Depositions are not considered. Bank v. Cawley, 20 D. & C. 207 (1933).
275. Queen-Favorite B. & L. Ass'n v. Burstein, 310 Pa. 219, 165 Atl. 13(1933). This applies, however, only to allegations of fact which are properly
pleaded, and which facts would be admissible in evidence. Architectural Tile
Co. v. McSorley, 311 Pa. 299, 166 Atl. 913 (1933). But see Germantown Trust
Co. v. Emhardt (#1), 321 Pa. 561, 184 Atl. 457 (1936).
276. Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 Atl. 377
(1933).
277. Frey v. United Traction Co., 320 Pa. 196, 181 Atl. 775 (1935).
278. Riling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472, 140 Atl. 270 (1928).
279. Guaranty Motors Co. v. Hudford Phila. Sales Co., 264 Pa. 557, 108 At.
30 (1919).
280. Hess v. Merion T. & T. Co., 317 Pa. 501, 177 At. 53 (1935).
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of defense is sufficient or is not sufficient where there are also pleaded set-
offs, counterclaims, or new matter, the relief being dependent, however,
upon the fundamental motions discussed above.281
MASSAORUSETTS
Massachusetts is another common law practice state with statutory
modification. 28 2 Probably more of the common law features have been re-
tained than in New Jersey, but it has nevertheless been considerably
modernized as compared to Delaware, which is unique in its retention of
old common law pleading.
Most of the modern practice is contained in the Practice Act of 1851 as
amended2 83 and as supplemented by rules of the supreme judicial, superior,
and district courts.284 The common law forms of pleading in personal ac-
tions have been retained in substance,1'8 but the designations have been
abolished, such actions now being classified as contract, tort, or replevin.1'8
The rules relating to joinder of causes and defenses are comparatively
281. For example, if an affidavit of defense is insufficient, and the counter-
claim pleaded by the defendant is likewise insufficient, the plaintiff may take
a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense and at the same
time file a reply in the nature of a statutory demurrer to the counterclaim.
Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 145 Atl. 67 (1929). If an affidavit of
defense is sufficient and the counterclaim is insufficient in substance, the plain-
tiff may only file a reply in the nature of a statutory demurrer. Riling v. Idell,
291 Pa. 472, 140 Atl. 270 (1928). New matter is considered the same as a
set-off and counterclaim, is subject to the same motions, and must be as full
and specific in its allegations of fact as a statement of claim. Isaac v. Donegal &
Conay Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 351, 152 Atl. 95 (1930).
282. There are, however, no separate law and equity courts.
283. GEN. LAWS (Ter. ed.) c. 231, referred to hereinafter only by chapter
and section.
284. See Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court (1926), 252 Mass. 585 (1926),
as amended; Rules of the Superior Court (1932); Rules of the District Court(1922).
285. The common counts may be pleaded, but not unitedly, but if necessary
in the alternative. C. 231, § 7, Seventh; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185
Mass. 306, 70 N. E. 202 (1904); Noble v. Segal, 214 Mass. 159, 100 N. E. 1112
(1913). The scope of the count on an account annexed has been widened and
is used extensively in commercial contract actions. C. 231, § 7, Fourth and Ninth;
and see, Hathaway v. Cronin, 17 N. E. (2d) 312 (Mass. 1938); Stock & Sons
v. Snell, 213 Mass. 449, 100 N. E. 830 (1913), 226 Mass. 499, 116 N. E. 263
(1917). Where common counts are pleaded, however, a bill of particulars must
be filed with the writ. C. 231, § 14. Failure to so file is ground for demurrer.
Brocklehurst Co. v. Marsch, 225 Mass. 3, 113 N. E. 646 (1916). As to answering
the common counts, see c. 231, § 26. Actions relating to real property are for
the most part governed by statute. C. 237-244. See also, c. 231, §§ 8, 9, 22.
286. C. 231, § 1. The division in which the action falls must be specified in
the writ. C. 231, § 11.
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strict, and joinder is limited to causes falling within the same division
of actions,2 87 and to consistent defenses.28 8  This formalism is, however,
largely offset -by liberal rules of amendment.2 9
Objections in the nature of pleas in abatement determinative by facts
dehors the record are raised by statutory answer in abatement, as dis-
tinguished from answer on the merits. 290 Where such matters in abatement
are apparent on the record, however, a motion to dismiss is the proper
practice.2 91 Objections in point of law are raised by statutory demurrer, 2 2
287. See c. 231, § 7, Sixth, relating to personal actions. Where doubt exists,
however, a count in tort and one in contract may be joined with an averment
that both are for one and the same cause of action. Plaintiff, in the discretion
of the court, may go to the jury on both counts, Atwater v. Clancy, 107 Mass.
369 (1871); or be required to elect, New Haven & N. Co. v. Campbell, 128
Mass. 104 (1880).
288. Jewett v. Locke, 72 Mass. 233 (1856). Equitable defenses and matter
which would avoid a defense in equity may, however, be pleaded in an action
at law. C. 231, §§ 31, 32.
289. C. 231, §§ 51, 52, 53, 54, 55. Super. Ct. Rules 5, 23, 25. The power
to permit amendments is very broad. Amendments are made by motion for
leave to amend before, during, or after trial, but before final judgment, and are
always subject to the sound discretion of the court. See Peladeau v. Gillespie
Lbr. Co., 285 Mass. 10, 188 N. E. 380 (1933). Many common law technical rules
of pleading have also been liberalized. For example, see note 285, supra, plead-
ing common counts, and note 288, supra, pleading equitable defenses, and matter
in avoidance of defenses.
290. C. 231, § 20. As to various matters in abatement, jurisdiction over
subject matter, wrong venue, jurisdiction over person, Thurman v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63 (1926), 46 A. L. R. 563 (1927);
another action pending, Security Co-Op. Bank v. McMahon, 2 N. E. (2d) 214(Mass. 1936); disability or incapacity of plaintiff, prematurity of action, see
discussion and cases cited in White v. E. T. Slattery Co., 236 Mass. 28, 127
N. E. 597 (1920). Questions of fact raised by answer in abatement may be
tried by jury if seasonably claimed. Second Nat. Bank of Malden v. Leary,
284 Mass. 321, 187 N. E. 611 (1933). 'The legal sufficiency of the answer in
abatement may be raised by demurrer, Thurman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63 (1926), 46 A. L. R. 563 (1927); not by motion
to dismiss, Wright v. Graustein, 229 Mass. 68, 118 N. E. 227 (1918). Cf. note
291, infra. On answering over on the overruling of an answer in abatement
on a demurrer, see c. 231, § 21, and see notes 301 and 302, infra. By statute
abatement will not be granted "for any circumstantial errors or mistakes if
by it the person and case may be rightly understood by the court; or for defect
or want of form only." C. 231, §49.
291. Paraboschi v. Shaw, 258 Mass. 531, 155 N. E. 445 (1927); Luce v.
Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 286 Mass. 343, 190 N. E. 539 (1934). But in
equity the objection is raised by demurrer. Rothstein v. Comm'r of Banks, 258
Mass. 196, 155 N. E. 7 (1927). The motion must be brought within the time
limited for entering an appearance and filing an answer. Super. Ct. Rule 25.
292. C. 231, §§ 15-19. Grounds for demurrer, in addition to other causes,
are stated in § 18: (1) misjoinder of causes of actions; (2) insufficiency of the
declaration (complaint) or some count thereof in law; (3) insufficiency of the
answer in law; (4) that the declaration or answer does not state a cause of
action or defense 'in accordance with the rules of pleading contained in the
practice act, C. 231. Specific causes for demurrer must be assigned. §§ 16, 17.
But the demurrer need not be verified. McCarthy v. Collector, 12 N. E. (2d)
722 (Mass. 1938). If the adverse party does not amend the pleadings demurred
to, he is deemed to have joined in demurrer. § 15. As to difference between
demurrer and plea in abatement and motion to dismiss, see Tyler v. Boot & Shoe
Workers Union, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509 (1933).
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corresponding to the common law general demurrer.2 9  Defects in the
formal stating of a cause may be similarly demurred to where the objections
are specified.294 Redundant, impertinent or scandalous matter may be at-
tacked by motion.2"8
The defendant must file his answer in abatement, demurrer or answer
within the time limited for his appearance.29 He may combine an answer
in abatement with an answer on the merits so long as the answer in abate-
ment is set forth first.2 97 The same is true of a demurrer.29 8 In such a case,
he may move for a trial on an issue raised by an answer in abatement before
trial on the merits, 29 9 or may set the demurrer down for a preliminary
hearing. 00
293. As to the following grounds of general demurrer, see misjoinder of
causes of actions. C. 231, § 18, First; Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288
Mass. 234, 192 N. E. 631 (1934). Insufficiency of declaration or a count thereof
in law. C. 231, § 18, Second; Bretta v. Meltzer, 280 Mass. 573, 182 N. E. 827(1932); Daddario v. City of Pittsfield, 17 N. E. (2d) 894 (Mass. 1938). But
where the demurrer is addressed to the whole declaration, it will be overruled
if any count thereof is good. Vitagraph Inc. v. Park Theatre Co., 249 Mass.
25, 144 N. E. 85 (1924). Insufficiency of the answer in law. C. 231, § 18, Third;
Montague v. Boston, & Fairhaven Iron Works, 97 Mass. 502 (1867). Incon-
sistency of defenses may be properly raised on this ground. Wolff v. Perkins,
254 Mass. 10, 149 N. E. 691 (1925). As to demurrers to answers in abatement,
see note 290, supra. The grounds of demurrer in any case may be stated in the
words of the statute. C. 231, § 18. Without more particularity. Bretta v.
Meltzer, 280 Mass. 573, 182 N. E. 827 (1932). Demurrers which are frivolous,
immaterial or interposed solely for the purpose of delay may be treated as a
nullity. C. 231, § 76.
294. Thus it is provided by c. 231, § 7, Second, that "the declaration shall
state concisely and with substantial certainty the substantive facts necessary
to constitute the cause of action." Failure to observe this rule may ba assigned
as grounds for statutory demurrer. C. 231, § 18, Fourth; Pollock v. N. E. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 289 Mass. 255, 194 N. E. 133 (1935); Grandchamp v. Costello, 289
Mass. 506, 194 N. E. 837 (1935). It seems that a demurrer may also lie for
irrelevancy. Willett v. Herrick, 242 Mass. 471, 136 N. E. 366 (1922). Where
defects or omissions in the form of the statement of the cause of action are
relied on, they must be specifically pointed out; otherwise they are waived.
Daddario v. City of Pittsfield, 17 N. E. (2d) 894 (Mass. 1938).
295. Super. Ct. Rule 24. Apart from this rule, the court has power to strike
irrelevant pleadings. Calnan v. Guaranty Security Corp., 271 Mass. 533, 171
N. E. 830 (1930); McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-Op Industries & Stores, Inc.,
272 Mass. 121, 172 N. E. 68 (1930) (answer).
296. Sup. Jud. Ct. Common Law Rule 6; Super. Ct. Rule 25. The court
may, in its discretion, permit pleadings to be filed or proceedings to be had at
other times. Brand v. Suburban Land Co., Inc., 12 N. E. (2d) 737 (Mass. 1938).
(filing of demurrer to defendant's set-off permitted at the trial).
297. O'Loughlin v. Bird, 128 Mass. 600 (1880); Craig Silver Co. v. Smith,
163 Mass. 262, 39 N. E. 1116 (1895). But see Finneran v. Graham, 198 Mass.
385, 84 N. E. 473, (1908), as to whether matter in abatement must be set forth
first.
298. Hobson v. Satterlee, 163 Mass. 402, 40 N. E. 189 (1895).
299. Parks v. Smith, 155 Mass. 26, 28 N. E. 1044 (1891).
300. Super. Ct. Rules 47, 61, 65. Hobson v. Satterlee, 163 Mass. 402, 40
N. E. 189 (1895); Bretta v. Meltzer, 280 Mass. 573, 182 N. E. 827 (1932).
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If, however, defendant pleads in abatement or demurs separately, pro-
vision is made for answering over where the plaintiff amends so as to cure
the defect,101 where the answer in abatement or demurrer is overruled.1
02
So too, where an issue on an answer in abatement is determined in favor
of the defendant and the demurrer is sustained, plaintiff may be given
leave to amend, subject to the discretion of the court.10 3
Objections to pleadings which are not properly raised within the time
limited are waived, 04 except such objections in point of law which are by
nature not waivable.30 The same general principles are applicable to sub-
sequent pleadings.30 6
In 1929, a statute was passed providing for the immediate entry of
judgment on motion in cases where plaintiff seeks recovery of a debt
or liquidated demand, on plaintiff's affidavit 3 7 verifying the cause of action
and stating that in his belief there is no defense thereto.30 8 The relief
provided is similar to summary judgment as discussed above, except that
the entry of judgment on a finding that defendant's affidavits fail to
301. C. 231, § 21 (answer in abatement); § 15 (demurrer); but the amend-
ment must be made by motion. See Super. Ct. Rule 23; Mass. Gas & Oil Co. v.
Go-Gas Co., 267 Mass. 122, 166 N. E. 563 (1929) (equity); Mann v. Rudnick,
2 N. E. (2d) 189 (Mass. 1936).
302. But subject to the discretion of the court. C. 231, § 52 (demurrer),
§ 53 (answer in abatement). Where an issue of fact is found against defendant
on an answer in abatement, the court may permit defendant to amend his answer
in abatement or answer over; otherwise, final judgment will be rendered against
him. C. 231, §§ 50, 53, except that where answer on the merits is filed with
answer in abatement, trial on the merits may then be had. Parks v. Smith, 155
Mass. 26, 28 N. E. 1044 (1891). A demurrer may be filed under leave to answer
ever after issue on answer in abatement was found against defendant. Young
v. Gilles, 113 Mass. 34 (1873).
303. C. 231, § 52 (demurrer), § 53 (answer in abatement). See note 289,
supra, amendments in general.
304. Matters in abatement are waived unless raised before or at the same
time as answering to the merits, Craig Silver Co. v. Smith, 163 Mass. 262, 39
N. E. 1116 (1895); or before filing an affidavit of merits, Whipple v. Rogerson,
78 Mass. 347 (1859). Purely formal objections to the pleadings are waived by
failure to raise by demurrer.
305. Dumas v. Meyer, 5 N. E. (2d) 14 (Mass. 1936). For instance, see:
Osgood v. Thurston, 40 Mass. 110 (1839), lack of jurisdiction; Mitchell v.
Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N. E. 39 (1934), failure to state a cause of action.
See also, Bretta v. Meltzer, 280 Mass. 573, 182 N. E. 827 (1932).
306. C. 231, § 34, puts the parties at issue after answer without replication
or further pleading. See also Super. Ct. Rule 26.
307. Or an affidavit of any other person who can swear to the facts.
C. 231, § 59B.
308. C. 231, § 59B; Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, 4 N. E. (2d)
450 (Mass. 1936), 107 A. L. R. 1215 (1937); Friede v. Mackey, 10 N. E. (2d)
102 (Mass. 1937). The motion for judgment is made on four days' notice, and
unless the defendant by his own evidence or by affidavit shows facts entitling
him to defend, judgment may be ordered. If defendant fails to appear or file
an affidavit, judgment may be entered by default.
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disclose facts entitling him to defend may, nevertheless, be defeated where
defendant files a demand for trial within seven days after the court's grant-
ing of the motion.30 9 The statute, therefore, does not authorize summary
judgment except on what amounts to defendant's consent, for defendant
may still demand a trial in the face of a finding that no real issue exists.3 10
DFLA~wAR
Practice and procedure in this jurisdiction is uniquely ancient. Strict
old common law pleading and practice as it existed prior to the Hilary
Rules and Procedure Acts of England 11 still governs procedure and prac-
tice in the law courts; for example, they still use the old common law
declarations, pleas in abatement and in bar, special and general demurrers,
common law forms of actions, although the distinction between case and
trespass has been abolished, equitable defenses may not be interposed in
a law case, and the demurrer is the only way of testing the sufficiency of
any pleading, although there does exist a summary judgment statute.3 12
309. Entry of judgment is suspended for seven days after the granting of
the motion and may then be entered if no demand for trial is filed. C. 231,
§ 59B. But if defendant files an insufficient affidavit and fails to appear at the
hearing, he is in default and may not avail himself of the right to demand a
trial. Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, 4 N. E. (2d) 450 (Mass. 1936),
107 A. L. R. 1215 (1937). As originally proposed, the statute sought to penalize
the unjustified demanding of a trial by providing ifiat a defendant who fails
to prevail on his defense be assessed additional costs to cover plaintiff's expenses,
including counsel fees. Annual Report, Judicial Council of Mass. (1925) 32,
141; (1925) 11 MAss. L. Q. 32, 141; Annual Report (1926) 12 id. at 44. This
provision was rejected by the legislature. See also, Finch, Summary Judgments
(1933) 18 MAss. L. Q. 15.
310. See Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504,
507, and comment thereon by Judicial Council of Mass., Annual Report (1933);
(1933) 19 MAss. L. Q. 24, reporting that in applying the statute, the courts do
not waste time by ordering summary judgment, thereby inviting defendant's
demand for trial and resulting in a further motion for advancing the case for
speedy trial, but rather deny the motion for judgment or advance the case for
trial. Judgment is generally ordered only where defendant has forfeited his right
to demand a trial by defaulting. Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. McCarthy, 4 N. E.
(2d) 450 (Mass. 1936), 107 A. L. R. 1215 (1937).
311. Hilary Rules, 1834. Procedure Acts, 1852, 1854 and 1860. For modern
effect of Hilary Rules, see Reppy, The Hilary Rules and Their Effect on Negative
and Affirmative Pleas under Modern Codes and Practice Acts (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L.
Ray. 95. The controlling authority for bench and bar on practice in the law
courts is the practice text by Hon. Victor B. Wooley (1906), for there have
been no major changes since then. The authority on pleading is CH=TTY,
PLEADING (12th ed. 1850), or earlier editions.
312. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 4648, provides for "judgments at first term"
in all actions on bills, notes, bonds, instruments for the payment of money,
recovery of book accounts, foreign judgments, or scire facias on recognizances
in Orphans or Chancery Court, judgments and mortgages. The plaintiff proceeds
by filing with the clerk a copy of the written instrument on which judgment is
19391
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Despite equity and law courts being separate, the five law judges, in
addition to their nisi prius duties, also gather together a few times a year
to sit as the supreme court and hear not only law appeals, but equity ap-
peals. The chancellor sits as a judge on law appeals.
Because all are familiar at least in a historical way with common law
pleading and practice, and as the most important phases of this practice
as connected with the subjects under consideration have already been
mentioned, particularly under the discussion of New Jersey and Mass-
achusetts, and as little ammunition for revisers' guns is here available,
it will serve no useful purpose to delve into the strict common law prac-
tice.
Despite the existence of the antiquated system, the writer knows of no
place, with the exception of Connecticut, where the practice of law is more
pleasant than in Delaware. The bench and bar are so small the members
are personally acquainted with each other, counsel do not indulge in dila-
tory tactics, chicanery, or misstatements, all of which might be the reason
that, despite the laws courts having had granted to them over seventy years
ago rule-making power, they have never exercised it to effect any substantial
reforms,313 although the chancery court practice is governed by rules made
in 1917; all of which induces an unassailable proposition that it is not
only the statutes and rules which make practice and procedure workable
and satisfactory in a jurisdiction, but what is more important is the exist-
ing local condition of the bench and bar.
demanded, together with an affidavit stating the sum demanded and that the
plaintiff believes the same is due. The defendant thereupon files an affidavit
stating that he believes there is a legal defense to all or part of the claim and
setting forth the nature of the defense; whereupon, if judgment is granted,
the defendant may give security for the judgment and obtain a stay of execution
for six months. The court under certain circumstances has the right to open
the judgment and let the defendant in to a trial. The court may determine
the amount of the judgment. If no judgment is rendered, the affidavits of the
parties may not be used in the case for any purpose whatsoever. The courts
do not favor "snap judgments" except in very clear cases, Spruance v. Anderson,
27 Del. 414, 89 Atl. 1 (Super. Ct. 1913). In furtherance of this, the courts say
that the facts contained in the defendant's affidavits for the purpose of the
motion are considered true. Layton v. Lawson, 27 Del. 143, 86 Atl. 520 (Super.
Ct. 1913). And the tendency is to hold the defense interposed as a bar to the
motion. Bloom v. Handloff, 29 Del. 172, 97 Atl. 586 (Super. Ct. 1916). Unfortu-
nately the motion is not very effective because of its very limited scope and the
very conservative attitude of the courts.
313. In 1917, some rules were passed which accomplished no substantial
reform, and in recent years there has been moderate agitation for revision of
pleading and practice. In fact, there is a committee now working upon such
a revision. There has also been agitation to have a separate supreme court of
three judges who would have no trial duties.
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COMMENT
Certain fundamentals and suggestions for a concise group of court
rules emerge from the foregoing discussion.
Pleadings should not exist to enable practitioners to demonstrate their
skill, but exist instead to aid in the administration of justices1' by promptly
disclosing the real issues so that they may be quickly determined. Cor-
rective amendments should not be limited so long as justice is done and no
one is actually, as distinguished from legally, surprised, nor should variance
defeat substantial justice, nor should it be necessary to label an action or
to observe formalistic technicalities in pleading as was necessary at com-
mon law and is still necessary in Delaware. Moreover, it does not seem
necessary to designate an action as at law or in equity, nor is it necessary
to attempt to distinguish between motions to quash, pleas in abatement
or to the jurisdiction or in bar, special and general demurrers, exceptions,
motions to strike, expunge, erase, make definite and certain, or for a bill
of particulars, or motions to elect remedies or causes of action, all of which
weapons permit a barrage of objections which tend to harass a party and
cause delay and create tenuous distinctions.
There should exist, as there does in Connecticut, where it is probably
least needed, some penalty provision to deter litigants and attorneys from
serving false, sham, improper or dishonest pleadings or affidavits, for these
hinder the speedy administration of justice. It seems advisable not to
permit appeals from interlocutory orders on dilatory motions, 15 for any
alert practitioner can hamstring a case for years with such appeals even
before he has to answer, particularly where too many successive motions
are permitted. For the same reason, all available objections to a pleading
should be taken at one time by one motion-otherwise be waived, excepting,
of course, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter and that
the claim or defense is insufficient at law. It is further deemed expedient
to permit the raising of all defenses in law or fact by answer, if not previ-
ously raised by motion, for the plaintiff may then move to dismiss the
pleading, or for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment on
the merits where the cause of action or defense is well pleaded.
314. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals (1927) 1 CONN. B. J. 67. Innocent
litigants should not be made to suffer for the lack of skill of their counsel.
315. Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts prohibit such appeals;
New York allows them.
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Most states have abolished common law forms of actions and provided
that there shall be one form of civil action and that a pleading should
contain a "plain and concise statement of the material facts."8 10 There is,
however, always some difficulty in determining what a "fact" is;3-7 hence,
the word "facts" was omitted in the new Federal Rules, which provide that
a pleading shall contain a "short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 3 18 However, despite the most
concise illustrative forms appended to the Federal Rules, it seems that
facts must still be alleged.3
19
When we have been served with a pleading, certain questions arise.
Has the court jurisdiction? Are there procedural defects? Does it con-
form to statutory and rule requirements? Is it otherwise defective as to
form? Should it be more specific? Is it defective or insufficient in sub-
stance? If we wish to object, how shall we do it? If rules provide that
all objections and defenses must be raised by motion or pleading and
then specify the nature of objections and defenses available by motion, per-
mitting, however, that all may be raised in the responsive pleading if not
taken by motion, it is clear that objections and defenses could be quickly
raised and passed upon, thereby preliminarily limiting issues of fact and
law. Proper rules may make a motion as formidable a weapon as the mem-
bers of any bench and bar may desire. Our first object should be to test
procedural defects, then to correct defects of form, next to have issues
of law resolved, and lastly to provide for summary relief in clear cases.
All these can be accomplished by motions.
Some say we should object to every defect in the pleading served and
follow through to the appellate court, for failure to do so will weaken our
position at every turn of the case.320 Others say, "Why move? You teach
316. N. Y. C. P. A. § 241. N. J. S. C. Rule 17 uses the term "issuable
facts"; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5513, "material facts"; MASS. GEN. LAws(1932) c. 231, § 8, "substantial facts"; Penn. Practice 'Act § 5, "material facts."
317. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes (1921) 21
COL. L. REv. 416; Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of Facts' (1937) 4 U. of CHr.
L. Rav. 233.
318. Federal Rule 8a (2); nor does the 1937 Illinois C. P. A. § 33 require
facts to be pleaded. REv. STLT. (1937) c. 110, § 157.
319. Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. Cal. 1938),
holding that no fact was stated to support the conclusion of "implied contract"
to pay.
320. See, for example, McCarty, Attacking a Defective Pleading (1934) 20
IOWA L. Rnv. 49. Some existing dangers are that the defective pleading will
be construed against the pleader, the jury sees too much, too much evidence
may be admitted, the theory of the case may be changed. See also Sorensen v.
Keesey Hosiery Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 73, 154 N. E. 826 (1926). Provision must
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your adversary to plead, he is permitted to amend, and then you are faced
with a stronger pleading and delay has occurred." 2' The solution depends,
of course, not only on each case, but upon the practice in each jurisdiction.
For example, in Connecticut we have seen that very few motions addressed
to form are made, while in New York they are used a great deal.
It should be possible to immediately raise certain procedural objections
comparable to the common law dilatory pleas. It should not be necessary,
as in Pennsylvania, to file an affidavit of defense on the merits and await
trial to raise such objections. 322 It is believed that such a rule should pro-
vide for preliminary attack where the following defects are claimed: no
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action; no jurisdic-
tion over the person; defects in process, its issuance or service; improper
venue; another action pending; lack of capacity of the plaintiff to sue.
Clearly these motions in many cases require a showing of extrinsic facts
and need affidavits to support them. It should be provided that if the
court cannot decide the question raised by the motion on the affidavits, it
may require oral testimony. These objections should be taken within a
specified time and be consolidated with the corrective motion next discussed.
In any event, they should be taken before answer, or otherwise be waived.32 3
All jurisdictions have some method available to correct and clarify
a pleading. Might it not be advisable to have one comprehensive rule to
clarify a pleading which would encompass the right to object by motion
to any departure from statutory or rule requirements as to form, i. e., to
state and number separately, to make definite and certain, to correct de-
fects of parties apparent on the face of the pleading, and misjoinder of
causes of action3 24 and to strike out? Little need be said about the benefit
be made, however, not to provide too many dilatory motions, for these arm the
shyster with weapons of delay. Their indiscriminate use should be discouraged
by the courts. Forbidding the raising of such matters seriatum would accomplish
this. See N. J. S. C. R. 42, and Federal Rule 12 (g).
321. No harm is done by leaving immaterial or irrelevant matter in a
complaint. Donovan v. Davis, 85 Conn. 394, 82 Atl. 1025 (1912). As the usual
course is amendment or re-pleading, the only result is delay. For a general
discussion of demurrers and motions, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 340
et seq.
322. The Procedural Rules Committee of Pennsylvania is contemplating
making available certain motions which would permit the raising of these
objections by preliminary motion.
323. Except, of course, jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the
action.
324. Misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and misjoinder of causes of action
will not be dealt with here, for they are properly a separate subject. There
should, of course, be available motions to correct such defects, for neither
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of a motion to require each cause of action and defense to be separately
stated and numbered, for most jurisdictions already have this remedy avail-
able in some form or other. In order to promote simplicity in responsive
pleading, however, it is equally important that each material allegation
be in a separate paragraph and separately numbered, and that the allega-
tions and the entire pleading be clear, concise and definite. The latter
requirements present a problem.
Should there be a motion to make a pleading more definite and certain,
with the additional remedy to move for a bill of particulars, as available
in New York; or should there be only one motion for a more specific state-
ment of claim, as in Pennsylvania and Connecticut; or should the function
of all of these be combined in a single motion ?7r, The solution would de-
pend upon whether the rules require a pleading to concisely state material
facts, as in New York and New Jersey, or just the nature of the claim,
as in Illinois and the Federal Rules, or completely set forth in detail all
the facts, as in Pennsylvania. It is felt conciseness and clarity of pleading
is better than the confusion of issues resulting from the lengthy pleadings
of Delaware and Pennsylvania, and hence it is urged that rules require
that the pleadings shall be in the simplest form possible, and yet clear
and definite enough so that the opponent knows the nature of the claim
or defense.
In most cases each party knows as much as the other about the case.
Nevertheless, an effort is usually made sometime before trial to obtain more
information. Would it not be best to squarely face the problem by recog-
nizing two needs; one, to provide a method of obtaining a very simple,
misjoinder nor defects of parties should defeat an action, nor should misjoinder
of causes defeat an action or require amendment unless the causes cannot be
tried together. The court should be permitted to remedy such defects at any
stage of the cause.
325. The New York distinction seems sound, but its necessity is questionable.
A motion to clarify by making more definite and ceitain lies in New York where
language is ambiguous, equivocal, uncertain or obscure, and the party is honestly
in doubt as to the meaning of his adversary's pleading; while a motion for a
bill of particulars lies to obtain more factual information than is required by
a legally sufficient pleading and to narrow issues, prevent surprise, and aid in
preparation for trial. See Arnold, Motions to Make Specific and to Resolve
Conclusions (1931) 7 IND. L. J. 77. However, some writers hold that there is
no distinction between these motions. See Note (1926) 24 MICH. L. REV. 315,
and Conover v. Knight, 84 Wis. 639, 54 N. W. 1002 (1893). See also Federal
Rule 12e. In Pennsylvania, so complete a statement of claim is required that
there is no provision for an examination before trial. In theory, the Pennsyl-
vania system of a full complaint saves a dilatory motion for a bill of particulars
as used in New York. In practice, however, the Pennsylvania motion for a more
specific statement is the same as the New York motion for a bill of particulars.
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concise and clear pleading to enable the drafting of a concise responsive
pleading by making available a motion to make definite and certain not
only language ambiguities and obscurities, but by requiring a disclosure
of the nature of the cause of action or defense with sufficient particularity
so that the opponent is given fair notice of the pleader's case; the other,
to provide by separate rule for more detailed and specific evidentiary in-
formation to aid in preparing for trial by making available rules for dis-
closure, discovery, deposition, examination before trial, and appropriate
pre-trial procedure, for clearly even the most specific complaint, supple-
mented by a further statement or bill of particulars, is at best a poor sub-
stitute for facts obtained as a result of these other procedural methods.
A pleader is entitled to know with certainty the nature of his op-
ponent's claim and what his essential contentions are. This may require
the clarification of language and the addition of some allegations, but
would not require disclosure of evidentiary facts to "prepare for trial. 3 28
The test for the "more definite and certain" phrase of our clarifying
motion would be whether the pleading attacked is clear, concise, and
definite enough that the opponent knows with sufficient particularity the
nature of the pleader's claim or defense so that a proper responsive plead-
ing may be drawn.
To insure adherence to our agreed proposition that pleadings shall set
forth simply, clearly and with definiteness the nature of the pleader's
claim or defense, we must provide a pruning shears. A provision in our
clarifying motion to strike out would accomplish this purpose. It shouldl
encompass the right to strike allegations, separate counts or defenses from
a pleading, if such part be immaterial, redundant, unnecessary, imper-
tinent, scandalous, or may tend to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair
trial of the action. It is to be noted, however, that sham and frivolous were
omitted from the specified grounds, for if a whole pleading, count, or
defense is sham, it may be attacked under the broad summary judgment
motion later provided, and if frivolous, it is insufficient in law and would
fall under the motion for dismissal of the pleading, count, or defense.
It has been said that a motion to strike and a demurrer are in effect
the same.32 7 It is not intended that the proposed motion to strike should
326. See Federal Rule 12e.
327. For an excellent article discussing demurrers, motions to strike, et
cetera, see Pike, Objections to Pleadings under tke New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1937) 47 YALm L. J. 50. In Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Putnal,
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encompass a demurrer or be limited by comparison to a demurrer. Such
a motion to strike on the grounds specified should permit the use of sup.
porting affidavits, as, for example, a defense might set up fraud, duress,
or grossly outrageous, dishonest conduct, which on its face in, for example,
a simple negotiable instruments case, would certainly look scandalous and
yet could be shown by affidavit to be relevant and material.
The court should not, as it does in Connecticut, frown on motions to
strike out, inasmuch as a pleading containing such improper matter does
not comply with the standard we have set, and thus it should not be per-
mitted to remain for counsel to read to the jury if he gets a chance. The
other grounds suggested for the comprehensive clarifying motion need
no discussion.
As delay results where rules permit a series of motions and appeals
from interlocutory orders, as is too freely allowed in New York, it should
be required that the two motions provided for above should be consolidated
into one motion requiring the various objections to be urged in the alterna-
tive. For example, if it is contended that there is a procedural defect such
as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, defective
process, et cetera, and the complaint contains obscure language, is not
properly divided into paragraphs and causes of action, and contains
scandalous matter, one motion, raising all these objections in the alterna-
tive, should be made. Thus we obtain an order with one procedural effort,
holding the court has jurisdiction, but requiring an amendment to clarify
language, paragraphs and causes of action, and to strike out certain
scandalous matter. As the motions are to obviate the need for or assist in
the drafting of a responsive pleading, it should be required that the ob-
jections be raised within a specified time or before filing a responsive plead-
ing, otherwise be waived.
57 Fla. 199, 49 So. 922 (1909), it is said that a motion to strike and a demurrer
should not be confused. The first is applicable where the whole or part of a
pleading is irrelevant or improper; whereas a demurrer attacks a pleading for
insufficiency. To the same effect, see Hammond v. Vetsburg, 56 Fla. 369, 48
So. 419 (1908). See also Comment (1933) 3 IDAHo L. J. 156, which states that
while the motion to strike and a demurrer are in theory different, they are for
practical purposes the same. See also, Shohoney v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R.,
231 Mo. 131, 132 S. W. 1059 (1910). Edgerton, The Consolidation of Preliminary
Motions and Demurrers in Connecticut (1913) 22 YALE L. J. 302, urged the
adoption of one motion covering the motion to expunge and the demurrer. Chad-
bourn, A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina (1936) 14 N. C. L.
Rnv. 211, 215, 216, says that a motion to strike as frivolous serves no useful pur-
poses that a demurrer does not perform.
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The practitioner. is next ready to interpose substantive defenses, either
by motions for judgment or by answer. Procedure should be provided so
that these defenses may be quickly raised and determined.
At common law, in Connecticut, and in Massachusetts, the demurrer
is the only method available for attacking the legal sufficiency of a plead-
ing before trial. In New York there exists an elaborate system for obtain-
ing the dismissal of pleadings, where certain defects do and do not appear
on the face of a pleading and where an entire answer or reply is sham or
frivolous. There is also a rule providing for judgment on the pleadings
and another for summary judgment, and still another for partial summary
judgment. Yet need the system be so complex?
Ordinarily, the legal sufficiency of a pleading, whether raised by de-
murrer or motion, is tested by applying the substantive law of the case
to the allegations of fact appearing on the face of the pleading and with-
out any showing of extrinsic facts. The same is true of motions for judg-
ment on the pleadings, which in addition should search the record and
condemn the first bad pleading. Demurrers and motions to dismiss a plead-
ing for legal insufficiency exist in nearly all jurisdictions. It is said that
such remedies are very valuable, for they permit the early determination
of the issues of law where there are admissions in the pleadings or where
no substantial issue of fact exists, and thus may completely obviate all
trial preparation. In view of the consistently granted leave to amend
curable defects and the granting of leave to plead over if the demurrer or
motion is dismissed, the writer has considerable doubt as to the efficacy
of these remedies. Most lawyers, however, would consider it heresy if their
practice did not specifically provide for some remedy to dismiss a plead-
ing for the legal insufficiency thereof. Hence, it is suggested that there be
made available to the plaintiff or defendant a motion like a demurrer to
dismiss an opponent's pleading for legal insufficiency appearing on the
face thereof,328 and also a motion for judgment on the pleadings, thus
raising issues of law when no issue of fact appears on the face of the
pleadings.329 It should, of course, be provided that such motions may not
328. Consolidation of these motions with a summary judgment motion,
would weaken the latter by permitting amendments, which have always been
permitted in the demurrer type motion. Also, in this age of unfounded and
"strike" suits, it is sometimes necessary, despite theoretical argument to the
contrary, not to have to disclose your hand by affidavits, as would have to be
done if these motions were combined.
329. These motions would be made without affidavits and be comparable to
the common law or statutory demurrer and be like Rules 106, 109, 111, 112
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delay the trial. If, however, they are made during the trial, it would seem
proper to decide the motion in the light of evidence already adduced.
Many articles have been written about summary judgment,3 0 and as
the subject has already been discussed under the New York statute, further
comment here will be relatively brief. This procedure defeats the law's
delays in clear cases where no genuine issue of material fact exists. It
provides the judge with fluoroscopic eyes so that with the help of affidavits
he may look through sham denials and defenses to ascertain whether
a bona fide triable issue of fact actually exists. It thwarts attorneys who
file pleadings legally sufficient upon their face but unsupportable in fact.
"The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what
is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and
substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suiter to the burden of a
trial."3 3' 1 It aids in lessening court congestion, discourages unfounded
litigation, the only purpose of which is to induce settlement by creating
a nuisance value by harassing the opposition with motions. Yet it has been
said there is "judicial antipathy to the device as being in derrogation of
the common law."" 2 Some attorneys too may oppose the procedure, for it
may quickly terminate a case, thereby decreasing the fee which would
in many cases be collectable after an impressive trial. Another objection
often heard is that the procedure only works if both lawyers are reputable,
as it is pointed out that any lawyer can draw an affidavit for his client
to sign which will show enough evidentiary facts to apparently raise a
triable issue of fact.
in New York, but apparently would be unlike Federal Rule 12, for 1 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 651, indicates that a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12 would be warranted not only on the disputed facts
appearing on the face thereof, but "when it is made to appear from the plead-
ings, affidavits, or depositions that there is no substantial dispute as to certain
facts which warrant a judgment for one party as a matter of law, although
some of those facts may be in issue under the pleadings." Quacre: Does this
not thereupon become the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment under
Federal Rule 56?
330. If any reader questions the advisability of summary judgment pro-
cedure, see the following articles, in addition to those mentioned in notes 83,
84, 240, 272, 309, 310, 327, 332: Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary
Civil Procedure (1928) 38 YAIM L. J. 193; Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure(1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504; Boesel, Summary Judgment Procedure (1930) 6
Wis. L. RE. 5; Ritter and Magnuson, The Motion for Summary Judgment and
Its Extension to All Classes of Actions (1936) 21 MARQ. L. REy. 33 (re Wiscon-
sin statute); Cohen, Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York(1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 825; Bush, Summary Judgments in California (1931)
36 CoM. L. J. 569.
331. Cardozo, J., in Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110(1926).
332. Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion Procedure (1938) 24 VA. L. REV. 711.
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To prevent such abuse, not only with respect to summary judgment
motions but with respect to all pleadings, the writer deems it most im-
portant, particularly for practice in metropolitan areas, that there exist
a rule which penalizes litigants and their counsel for filing sham pleadings,
motions and affidavits, and that such penalty should be more severe than
the imposition of costs. 3  The court should have some method of testing
the conscience and good faith of an attorney. He should be required to
sign pleadings, and this should be an indication that he believes the aver-
ments contained in such pleadings are supported by the facts. Thus, a
reputable attorney would not file sham, frivolous, or scandalous pleadingsi
motions, or affidavits. The litigant should not merely be subject to the
imposition of double or triple costs, but the attorney should be subject to
censure, suspension, or disbarment, depending upon the gravity of his
particular offense.
Historically, summary judgment was only permitted in the clearest
of cases; for example, in actions on bills of exchange or negotiable in-
struments. We have seen that the class of cases in which this remedy has
been made available has been gradually enlarged, reaching its widest scope
in Connecticut and New York. There seems to be no reason, except his-
torical inertia, why summary judgment procedure should not be made
available in every kind of a case, as is provided in Federal Rule 56,111 nor is
there any reason why the remedy should not be likewise available to a de-
fendant before or after answer. On such a motion, any and all defenses
of law could be raised along with evidentiary facts supporting the defense
on the merits. It would be well to postpone plaintiff's right to make
the motion for summary judgment until after a responsive pleading has
been filed, thus obviating the necessity of raising defenses and issues of
fact in defendant's affidavit prior to answer.
It seems advisable, as in the Federal Rule 56, that a summary judg-
ment motion may be made with or without affidavits, as it is conceivable
that depositions, examinations, admissions, et cetera, may be sufficient to
sustain the judgment without affidavits. The New York, and Connecticut
requirements respecting the sufficiency of the affidavits seem advisable. It
333. Conn. P. B., Rule 82, see note 207, supra; N. J. S. C. Rule 33; Federal
Rule 11, signing of pleadings by the attorney, and discussion thereof in 1
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 613 et seq.; also Federal Rule 56g, and 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3187.
334. There is an excellent discussion of this rule in 3 MooR, -FEDERALPRACTICE (1938) 3171 et seq. If the rule were as broad as suggested, New York
would not need R. C. P. 104, 107, 110.
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is clear as held in New York that the court is not empowered to try the
case on affidavits, but merely to ascertain whether a bona fido triable issue
of material fact exists.
If no triable issue of fact exists other than the amount of damages,
New York Civil Practice Rule 113 provides that these may be determined
by the court alone, a referee, or by the court and jury, whichever shall be
appropriate. It has been held that a party in default has no constitutional
right to a trial by jury of the issue of damages, and it is believed the same
principal applies on a summary judgment motion if the sole issue is the
amount of damages, since the failure to present a defense sufficient in law
is in effect a default,3 5 As this proposition is debatable, if summary judg-
ment is available in all kinds of cases, might it not be advisable to give the
defendant the right to elect whether the issue of damage shall be de-
termined by the court alone, a referee, or by the court and a jury?
It is, nevertheless, important to note that the affidavit of a plaintiff, to-
gether with the pleadings, depositions and admissions, must establish his
claim and negative the defenses and denials of his adversary. The defend-
ant, if making the motion, must similarly establish that his defenses or
denials are sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's claim. The opposing party,
to defeat the movant, must thereupon show that there are evidentiary
facts existing which create a bona fide, arguable, triable issue of fact. Local
conditions should dictate the notice required when summary judgment is
demanded. In any event, ample time should be afforded to permit proper
preparation of law and fact data without recourse to an application for
adjournment.
If the court finds no bona fide issue of material fact, it of course may
summarily dispose of the case, for, as in New York, complicated issues of
law which the court must decide anyhow should not defeat the motion,
nor should, as in Connecticut, an additional pleading be required to raise
such issue of law, nor should the entire procedure be nullified, as in Mass-
achusetts,336 by permitting the defendant to file a demand for trial. If, on
the other hand, the court finds a triable issue of fact and believes a com-
plete trial on the merits is not necessary, then a provision similar to New
335. McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N. Y. 347, 169 N. E. 605
(1930); Shientag, Summary Judgment (1935) 4 FoRiHAmt L. Rzv. 186, 189;
Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504, 507.
336. Massachusetts actually has no real summary judgment procedure. In
discussing the Massachusetts statute, Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure(1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504, 507, states, "A better joke has never been enacted
in all legislative annals nor a better argument for placing court procedure in
the hands of of the courts, where it belongs .... .
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York Civil Practice Rule 108 might be advisable, as then the court might,
under proper circumstances, clearly and succinctly state in an interlocu-
tory order the questions of fact which may be tried by a jury or referee,
as the case may require, the findings of which shall be reported back to
the court, so that a final order on the summary judgment motion may be
entered; or the court might be permitted to require supplemental affidavits
or depositions clarifying certain evidentiary facts. Federal Rule 56 (d)
is interesting in that it incorporates in summary judgment procedure cer-
tain pre-trial features by requiring the court, wherever practicable, to in-
clude in its order denying summary judgment the issues of fact, including
those of damages, which are admitted by the papers or concerning which
there is no substantial controversy, which issues are thereupon deemed
established on the trial. It is to be noted that this requirement exceeds
the function of the court in the optional pre-trial procedure established
by Federal Rule 16.
In the last analysis, counsel and litigants must have faith in their
judges; and even though judicial discretion is sometimes abused, it seems
advisable to vest considerable latitude and discretion in the courts so they
may determine, by experience or "hunch," if a genuine triable issue of fact
exists.
It should, of course, also be provided that partial summary judgment
may be rendered where warranted, and the procedure should be the same
as in the motion for summary judgment. It is believed advisable that judg-
ment rendered as a result of a summary judgment motion be appealable,
although if it is only to part of the case, it is in a sense an interlocutory
order, from which no appeal should lie. 37
The writer believes that the foregoing suggestions, if incorporated into
rules of practice, will provide a workable system for quickly and effective-
ly raising objections to pleadings and of obtaining judgment, thus facilitat-
ing the pleading stage of litigation by eliminating much expense and many
delays now unnecessarily incurred. No attempt has been made to work
out the innumerable details necessary to adopt such suggestions into any
particular system of practice. That is, of course, a matter of local concern.
It is hoped, however, that sound principles relating to this limited field
of practice are disclosed from the material and discussion here presented.
337. 3 M 0RE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3191, 3192, discusses the question
of appeals relating to Federal Rule 56. See, however, the New York practice,
which permits appeals from summary judgment or the denial thereof.
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§ 5513. PLEADINGS TO ALLEGE THE MATERIAL FACTS IN CONCISE FORM. Each
pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on
which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved;
such statement being divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each
containing as nearly as may be a separate allegation ...
§ 5515. PROLIX OR UNCERTAIN PLEADING MAY BE EXPUNGED OR CORRECTED.
Unnecessary repetition, prolixity, scandal, impertinence, obscurity or uncertainty
in any pleading, or the incorporation of irrelevant, immaterial or evidential
matter, shall be ground for a motion to expunge or otherwise correct such plead-
ing. Such motions shall be in writing, shall specify the particular exceptions, and
the action of the court thereon shall, upon appeal after final judgment, be re-
viewable by the Supreme Court of Errors.
RULES OF COURT*
§ 52. SCOPE OF REMEDY. A summary judgment may be entered in any ac-
tion to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money, with or without interest,
arising (First) (a) on a negotiable instrument, a contract under seal or a
recognizance; (b) on any other contract, express or implied, excepting quasi
contracts; (c) on a judgment for a stated sum; (d) on a statute where the sum
sought to be recovered is a fixed sum or in the nature of a debt; (e) on a
guaranty, whether under seal or not, when the claim against the principal is in
respect of a debt or liquidated demand only; and (Second) in any other action
(f) for the recovery of specific chattels, with or without a claim for withholding
the same, provided that if such claim be for other than nominal damages and be
unliquidated, it may be severed and proceeded with as provided in Section 54;
(g) to quiet and settle the title to real estate or any interest therein; (h) to dis-
charge any claimed invalid mortgage, lien, caveat or lis pendens.
§ 53. PROCEDURE. In any such action final judgment shall be entered by the
court at any time after the defendant has appeared, either before or after an
answer has been filed, upon written motion and affidavit, in duplicate, of the
plaintiff or of any person having personal knowledge of the facts, verifying the
cause of action, and the amount he believes to be due and his belief that there
is no defense to the action, unless a defendant, within ten days after the filing
of such motion and affidavit or within such further time as the court for good
cause shown may prescribe, shall show by affidavit such facts as may be deemed
by the court sufficient to entitle him to defend. The clerk shall forthwith give
to each defendant written notice of the filing by the plaintiff of such motion
and affidavit. The court may, on motion of the plaintiff, order stricken from the
files any affidavit of a defendant found by it to be insufficient, frivolous, false, or
made only for the purpose of delay.
§ 54. JUDGMENT FOR PART OF CLAIM. If it appears that such defense ap-
plies only to a part of the plaintiff's claim, or that any part is admitted, the plain-
*Connecticut Practice Book (1934).
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tiff may have final judgment forthwith for so much of his claim as the defense
does not apply to, or as is admitted, on such terms as may be just; and the action
may be severed and proceeded with as respects the remainder of the claim.
§ 55. QuEsTioNs OF LAW. If the court, upon the filing of the affidavits as
provided in Section 53, shall be of opinion that the only question or questions
arising are bona fide questions of law, it shall file its finding so stating and that
the defendant has no defense on the facts, and thereafter the defendant shall,
'if he so desires, file within ten. days a pleading appropriate to test such question
or questions of law. If the defendant fails to file such pleading within ten days
or within such further time as the court for good cause shown may prescribe, or
fails to prevail thereon, final judgment, as of course, shall be entered by the
court for the plaintiff.
§ 56. APPLICATION OF RULES. The provisions of these rules shall apply to
counterclaims, and to all pending actions.
§ 61. MOTION TO STRIKE OUT. When any pleading or motion is sham, or
frivolous, or improperly filed, or unfit by reason of its indecent or scandalous al-
legations to become a part of the record, it may be stricken out on written motion.
The motion to strike out shall not be used except as provided herein.
§ 62. MOTION FOR MORE SPECIFIC STATEMENT. Where the pleadings do not
fully disclose the ground of claim or defense, and the adverse party desires an
order for fuller and more particular statements, he shall make his motion in
writing, stating briefly the grounds thereof and the particulars desired.
§ 63. MOTION TO EXPUNGE. The motion to expunge provided for in General
Statutes, Section 5515, is an exclusive remedy, and will be granted when the de-
fect is plain, but not otherwise.
§ 64. MOTION FOR DEFECTIVE PLEADING; CONTENTS. Any motion addressed
to a pleading shall embrace every cause of defect then existing not properly
reached by plea in abatement or demurrer.
§ 65. MOTION FOR MISJOINDER OF PARTIES. The exclusive remedy for mis-
joinder of parties is by motion.
§ 82. DISCLOSURE or DEFENsn. In cases in which there is an appearance
by attorney for the defendant the plaintiff may at any time require such at-
torney to present to the court, to become a part of the file in such case, a writing
signed by him stating whether he has reasons to believe and does believe that
there exists a bona fide defense to the plaintiff's action and whether such defense
will be made, together with a general statement of the nature or substance of
such defense. If such attorney shall fail to disclose as required, or shall not
satisfy the court that such defense will be made, the court may order judgment
to be entered for the plaintiff; and if such attorney shall intentionally or reck-
lessly make a false statement with a view to procure the continuance or post-
ponement of an action, the court may suspend him from practice as attorney in
said court for such time as it shall deem proper.
§ 83. ORDER OF PLEADING. The order of pleading subsequent to the com-
plaint shall be:
(1). Plea in abatement, or to the jurisdiction;
(2). Motion addressed to the complaint;
(3). Demurrer to complaint;
(4). Answer;
(5). Motion addressed to answer;
(6). Demurrer to answer;
(7). Reply.
Further pleading shall be had, if necessary, until issue is joined.
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§ 84. WAIVING RIGHT TO PLEADING. In all cases, when the court does not
otherwise order, the filing of any pleading provided for by Section 83 will waive
the right to file any pleading which might have been filed in due order and which
precedes it in the order of pleading provided in that section.
§ 97. DEMURRER. The demurrer is the only remedy before trial by which
to test the sufficiency of a cause of action or defense, whether stated in one plead-
ing, a count or defense, or in a paragraph or paragraphs thereof. The demurrer
in each case must be to the entire cause of action or an entire or partial defense
so stated, and can be used for no *other purpose.
Where, however, several causes of action or several defenses are stated in
a single pleading or count, a demurrer may be addressed to such pleading or
count in so far as it purports to state one or more of such causes of action or
defenses.
§ 98. DEMURRER TO RELIEF. Where any relief demanded by the plaintiff
cannot properly be demanded upon the allegations of the complaint, although
these may be sufficient to call for some other relief, the defendant may demur to
the relief so improperly demanded.
MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL LAWS (Tercentenary ed.) ch. 231.
§ 15. DEMURRERS. Either party may demur to the pleadings of the adverse
party, but no mere defects of form in the declaration or in the subsequent plead-
ings shall be assigned as causes of demurrer. If the adverse party does not
amend the pleadings demurred to, he shall be held to have joined in demurrer.
9 18. CAUSES FOR DEMURRER. Demurrers may be for the following as well
as other causes:
First, That a count in contract and a count in tort, or that a count in the
plaintiff's own right and a count in some representative capacity, are improperly
joined in the declaration; or that a declaration in contract or in tort is inserted
in a writ of replevin.
Second, That the matters contained in the declaration or in some count there-
of are insufficient in law to enable the plaintiff to maintain his action.
Third, That the matters contained in the answer are insufficient in law to
constitute a defense to the action or to some count in the declaration.
Fourth, That, in some particular or particulars specifically pointed out, the
declaration or some count thereof does not state a cause of action, or the answer
does not state a defense to the declaration or some count thereof, substantially
in accordance with the rules contained in this chapter.
§ 20. ANSWER IN ABATEMENT. A defense to a real, personal or mixed ac-
tion, which formerly might have been made by a plea in abatement, may be made
by answer in abatement.
§ 21. ANSWERING OVER. If an answer in abatement is overruled on de-
murrer, or if, in consequence of such answer in abatement, the plaintiff amends,
the defendant, within such time as the court orders, shall in a personal action
answer, and in a real or mixed action plead, to the merits.
§ 49. No ABATEMENT FOR CIRCUMSTANTIAL ERRORS. No writ, process, ac-
tion, declaration or other proceeding in the courts or course of justice shall be
abated, arrested, quashed or reversed for any circumstantial errors or mistakes
if by it the person and case may be rightly understood by the court; or for de-
fect or want of form only.
§ 76. FRIVOLOUS OR IMMATERIAL DEMURRERS. If a demurrer is overruled
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because it appears to the justice hearing it to be frivolous, immaterial, or in-
tended for delay, the case shall proceed to judgment as if no demurrer had been
filed, and execution may be awarded or stayed upon terms.
RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Rule 24. STRIKING OUT. There shall be no right to except to bills, answers
and other proceedings for scandal or impertinence, but the court may, upon
motion or its own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent or scandalous
matter in any pleading or paper at law or in equity or divorce, stricken out,
upon such terms as the court shall think fit.
NEW JERSEY
LAW COURTS
REVIsED STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY (1937) as amended by CUMULATIvM
SUPPLEMENT OF 1938.
Tit. 2, c. 27, § 110. PLEADINGS ACCORDING TO RULES. The pleadings in all
actions shall be according to rules.
Tit. 2, c. 27, § 114. MOTION TO STRIKE PLEADING; NOTICE; CONTENTS. The
notice of a motion to strike out any pleading or any part thereof shall contain
a particular statement of the defects in or objections to such pleading on which
the party giving the notice intends to rely, and matters not specified in the
notice shall not be considered upon the hearing.
Tit. 2, c. 27, § 124 (Amend. 1938). STRIKING DEFENSES; DEFENSE ON TERMS;
APPEAL FROM ORDER. Subject to rules, any defense to the whole or to any part
of the complaint which defense is insufficient in law or sham may be struck out,
or, if it appears probable that the defense is insufficient in law or sham, defend-
ant may be allowed to defend on terms. Defendant, after final judgment, may
appeal from any order made against him under this section.
Tit. 2, c. 27, § 125 (Amend. 1938). STRIKING COMPLAINT OR COUNTERCLAIM
OR PART THEREOF. Subject to rules, a complaint or counterclaim insufficient in
law or sham, or any count or part thereof, may be struck out, or, if it appears
probable that the complaint or counterclaim is insufficient in law or sham, plain-
tiff or counterclaimant may be allowed to proceed therewith on terms.
Tit. 2, c. 27, § 126 (Amend. 1938). STRICKEN COMPLAINT OR COUNTERCLAIM
AS BAR TO ANOTHER PROCEEDING FOR SAME CAUSE. The court, in passing on a
motion to strike out, in whole or in part, a complaint or counterclaim as in-
sufficient in law or sham, may, in its discretion, determine whether such striking
out shall be with or without prejudice to the institution of another proceeding at
law, based on the same cause or causes of action as were set forth in the com-
plaint or counterclaim or part or parts thereof struck out, which discretion
shall be exercised by the court and be indicated in the order to strike out.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
Rule 30. ORDER OF PLEADINGS. The order of pleadings shall be:
1. Complaint;
2. Motion addressed to the complaint;
3. Answer;
4. Motion addressed to the answer;
5. Reply.
Further pleadings may be had, if necessary, until issue is joined. Unless
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Rule 39. OBJECTIONABLE PLEADINGS. Unnecessary repetition, prolixity,
scandal, impertinence, obscurity and uncertainty, and any other violation of the
rules of pleading, are respectively objectionable; also any pleading which is
irregular, defective or so framed as to embarrass or delay a fair trial.
Rule 40. DEMURRmS AnE ABOLISHED. Any pleading may be struck out on
motion on the ground that it discloses no cause of action, defense or counterclaim
respectively. The order made upon such motion is appealable after final judg-
ment. In lieu of a motion to strike out, the same objection, and any point of
law (other than a question of pleading or practice) may be raised in the answer-
ing pleadings, and may be disposed of at, or after, the trial; but the court, .on
motion of either party, may determine the question so raised before trial, and
if the decision be decisive of the whole case the court may give judgment for
the successful party or make such order as may be just.
Rule 41. OBJECTIONS TO PLEADINGS other than those provided for in Rule
40 above, shall be made by motion. The action of the court thereon is appealable
after final judgment.
Rule 42. OBJECTIONS TO PLEADINGS. Every motion addressed to a plead-
ing must present every cause of objection then existing.
Rule 43. MOTIONS. Every notice of any motion addressed to a pleading
shall specify the grounds thereof.
Rule 56. DILATORY PLEAS. Pleas to the jurisdiction and pleas in abatement
are abolished. In lieu thereof objection shall be made on motion. The evidence
necessary to determine the question may be taken by depositions, or as the court
may direct. The action of the court upon such motion may be reviewed on ap-
peal after final judgment.
Rule 80. When an answer is filed in an action brought to recover a debt or
liquidated demand arising-
(a) Upon contract express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
(b) Upon a judgment for a stated sum; or
(c) Upon a statute;
the answer may be struck out and judgment final may be entered upon motion
and affidavit as hereinafter provided, unless the defendant by affidavit or other
proofs shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion,
sufficient to entitle him to defend.
Rule 81. The motion to strike out shall be made upon affidavit of the plain-
tiff or that of any other person cognizant of the facts, verifying the cause of
action, and stating the amount claimed and his belief that there is no defense
to the action.
Rule 82. If it appear that such defense applies only to part of plaintiff's
claim, or that any part is admitted, the plaintiff may have final judgment forth-
with for so much of his claim as the defense does not apply to or as is admitted,
subject to such terms as may be deemed just.
Rule 83. Leave to defend may be given unconditionally, or upon such terms
as to giving security, or time or mode of trial, or otherwise, as may be deemed
just.
Rule 85. The provisions of these rules relative to striking out a frivolous
or sham defense shall be applicable to motions to strike out a complaint or coun-
terclaim as authorized by Chapter 151 of the Laws of 1928. [REV. STAT. tit. 2,
c. 27, §§ 124-129, see supra.]
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NEw YoRK
Crvm PRACTICE ACT
C. P. A. § 278. CERTAIN OBJECTIONS; WHEN WAiVED. An objection on either
of the following grounds, appearing on the face of a pleading, is waived unless
taken by motion:
1. As to the complaint: (a) that the court has not jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant in cases where jurisdiction may be acquired by his consent;
(b) that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; (c) that another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause; (d) that there is a mis
joinder of parties plaintiff; (e) that there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or de-
fendant.
2. As to a counterclaim: (a) that the defendant has not legal capacity to
recover upon the same; (b) that another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause; (c) that the counterclaim is now one which may be
properly interposed in the action.
C. P. A. § 279. CERTAIN OBJECTIONS NOT WAIVED. An objection as to the
jurisdiction of the court, except as otherwise provided in the preceding section,
and the objection that a complaint, or a statement therein of a separate cause
of action, or a counterclaim, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, or that a defense is insufficient in law upon the face thereof, are not
waived by failure to raise the same before trial.
C. P. A. § 476. JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS OR ADMISSION OF PART OF CAUSE.
Judgment may be rendered by the court in favor of any party or parties, and
against any party or parties at any stage of an action or appeal, if warranted
by the pleadings or the admissions of a party or parties; and a judgment may
be rendered by the court as to a part of a cause of action and the action pro-
ceed as to the remaining issues, as justice may require.
RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE
R. C. P. 90. FORIAL REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADINGS. Each separate cause of
action, counterclaim or defense shall be separately stated and numbered, and
shall be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each as nearly as may
be containing a separate allegation. The allegations contained in a separately
numbered paragraph of one cause of action, counterclaim or defense may be
incorporated as a whole in another cause of action, counterclaim or defense in
the same pleading by reference without otherwise repeating them. Denials of
facts alleged in the complaint or in an answer and denied by reply must not
be repeated nor incorporated in a separate defense or counterclaim. Any fact
once denied shall be deemed denied for all purposes of the pleading.
R. C. P. 102. MOTION TO CORRECT PLEADING. If any matter contained in a
pleading be so indefinite, uncertain or obscure that the precise meaning or ap-
plication thereof is not apparent, or if there be a misjoinder of parties plain-
tiff or a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant, the court may order the party
to serve such amended pleading as the nature of the case may require.
R. C. P. 103. STRIKING OUT MATTER CONTAINED IN A PLEADING. If any mat-
ter, contained in a pleading, be sham, frivolous, irrelevant, redundant, repetitious,
unnecessary, impertinent or scandalous or may tend to prejudice, embarrass or
delay the fair trial of the action, the court may order such matter stricken out,
in which case the pleading will be deemed amended accordingly, or the court
may order an amended pleading to be served omitting the objectionable matter.
R. C. P. 104. SHnA OR FRIVOLOUS ANSWER OR REPLY. If an answer or reply
be sham or frivolous the court may treat the pleading as a nullity and give
1939]
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judgment accordingly or allow a new pleading to be served upon such terms as
the court deems just.
R. C. P. 105. MOTION ADDRESSED TO PLEADING. A motion under Rules 102,
103, or 104, must be noticed within twenty days from the service of the pleading
to which the motion is addressed. The time to make such motion shall not be ex-
tended unless notice of at least two days of an application for such extension be
given to the adverse party.
R. C. P. 106. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT; WHEN THE DEFECT APPEARS ON FACT
OF COMPLAINT. Within twenty days after the service of the complaint, the de-
fendant may serve notice of motion for judgment dismissing the complaint, or
one or more causes of action stated therein, where it appears on the face thereof:
1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
2. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
3. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
4. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.
5. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action.
R. C. P. 107. MOTION Fop JUDGMENT; WHEN THE DEFECT DOES NOT AP-
PEAR ON FACE OF COMPLAINT. Within twenty days after the service of the
complaint, the defendant may serve notice of motion for judgment dismissing
the complaint, or one or more causes of action stated therein, on the complaint and
affidavit stating facts tending to show:
1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
2. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
3. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
4. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.
5. That there is an existing final judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered on the merits, determining the same cause of action
between the parties.
6. That the cause of action did not accrue within the time limited by law
for the commencement of an action thereon.
7. That the claim or demand set forth in the complaint has been released.
8. That the contract on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds.
9. That the cause of action did not accrue against the defendant because
of his infancy or other disability.
R. C. P. 108. DETERMINATION OF THE MOTION. If the plaintiff on the hear-
ing of a motion specified in the last rule shall present affidavits denying the facts
alleged by the defendant or shall state facts tending to obviate the objection, the
court may hear and determine the same and grant the motion, and in its dis-
cretion allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint upon such terms as are just;
or it may direct that the questions of fact, which shall be clearly and succinctly
stated in the order, be tried by a jury or referee, the findings of which shall be
reported to the court for its action; or it may overrule the objections, and in its
discretion may allow the same facts to be alleged in the answer as a defense. If
the objections be made to some of the causes of action, and not to all, judgment
may be entered as provided in Section 96 of the Civil Practice Act or Rule 195
of the Rules of Civil Practice.
R. C. P. 109. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ON THE ANSWER. Within ten days after
the service of an answer, the plaintiff may serve notice of motion to dismiss a
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counterclaim or strike out a defense consisting of new matter contained therein,
where one or more of the following defects appear on the face thereof:
1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the counterclaim.
2. That the defendant has not legal capacity to recover on the counterclaim.
3. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.
4. That the counterclaim is not one which may be properly interposed in
the action.
5. That the counterclaim does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action.
6. That the defense consisting of new matter is insufficient in law.
R. C. P. 110. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION; WHEN DEFECT DOES NOT APPEAR ON
FACE) OF ANSWER. Within ten days after the service of the answer, the plaintiff
may serve notice of motion for judgment dismissing a counterclaim on the plead-
ings and an affidavit tending to show:
1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the counterclaim.
2. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.
3. That there is an existing final judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered on the merits determining the same cause of action
between the parties.
4. That the claim or demand set forth in the counterclaim has been released.
5. That the contract on which the cause of action alleged in the counter-
claim is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.
Rule 108 shall apply to the determination of the motion.
R. C. P. 111. MOTION ON REPLY. Within ten days after service of a reply,
the defendant may move to strike out the reply, or a separate defense therein, on
the ground that it is insufficient in law upon the face thereof.
R. C. P. 112. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AFTER ISSUE
JOINED. If either party be entitled to judgment on the pleadings, the court may,
on motion, give judgment accordingly, and without regard to which party makes
the motion.
R. C. P. 113. SUMMARY JUDGMENT. WHEN AN ANSWER IS SERVED IN AN
ACTION.
1. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a contract express or
implied in fact or in law, sealed or not sealed; or
2. To recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a judgment for a
stated sum; or
3. On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a sum of money
other than a penalty; or
4. To recover an unliquidated debt or demand for a sum of money only
arising on a contract express or implied in fact or in law, sealed or not
sealed, other than for breach of promise to marry; or
5. To recover possession of a specific chattel or chattels with or without
a claim for the hire thereof or for damages for the taking or detention
thereof; or
6. To enforce or foreclose a lien or mortgage; or
7. For specific performance of a contract in writing for the sale or pur-
chase of property, including such alternative and incidental relief as the
case may require; or
8. For an accounting arising on a written contract, sealed or not sealed.
The complaint may be dismissed or answer may be struck out and judgment
entered in favor of either party on motion upon the affidavit of a party or of
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any other person having knowledge of the facts, setting forth such evidentiary
facts as shall, if the motion is made on behalf of the plaintiff, establish the
cause of action sufficiently to entitle plaintiff to judgment, and if the motion is
made on behalf of the defendant, such evidentiary facts, including copies of all
documents, as shall fully disclose defendant's contentions and show that his
denials or defenses are sufficient to defeat plaintiff, together with the belief of
the moving party either that there is no defense to the action or that the action
has no merit, as the case may be, unless the other party, by affidavit or other
proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion
sufficient to entitle him to a trial of the issues. If upon such motion made on
behalf of a defendant it shall appear that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment,
the judge hearing the motion may award judgment to the plaintiff, even though
the plaintiff has not made a cross-motion therefore.
If the plaintiff or defendant in any action set forth in subdivisions 3, 4 or 5
hereunder shall.fail to show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing
the motion, to present any triable issue of fact other than the question of the
amount of damages for which judgment should be granted, an assessment to de-
termine such amount shall forthwith be ordered for immediate hearing to be
tried by a referee, by the court alone, or by the court and a jury, whichever
shall be appropriate. Upon the rendering of the assessment, judgment in the
action shall be rendered forthwith.
When in any actions in cases set forth in subdivisions 6, 7 and 8 hereunder
the judge hearing the motion has been convinced that there is no preliminary
triable issue of fact, the court shall forthwith render an appropriate judgment or
order and thenceforth the action shall proceed in the ordinary course.
Where an answer is served in any action setting forth a defense which is
sufficient as a matter of law, where the defense is founded upon facts established
prima facie by documentary evidence or official record, the complaint may be
dismissed on motion unless the plaintiff by affidavit, or other proof, shall show
such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to raise
an issue with respect to the verity and conclusiveness of such documentary
evidence or official record.
This rule shall be applicable to counterclaims, so that either party may move
with respect to the same as though the counterclaim were an independent action.
The court in its discretion may provide for the withholding of entry of judg-
ment until the disposition of the issue in the main case.
This rule shall be applicable to all pending actions.
R. C. P. 114. PARTIAL JUDGMENT. If it appears that such defense applies
only to part of plaintiff's claim, or that any part be admitted, the plaintiff may
have final judgment forthwith for so much of his claim as such defense does not
apply to or as is admitted, on such terms as may be just, and the action may be
severed.
If it appear that a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 113 applies
only to one or more of several causes of action or to one or more of several
parties plaintiff or defendant, and that defendant's contentions are sufficient
to dispose of the claims of the complaint in such part, the defendant may have
final judgment forthwith dismissing the complaint to the extent warranted, on
such terms as may be just and the action may be severed.
[Vol.,
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PENNSYLVANIA
THE PRACTICE ACT OF 1915.
[PuRON'S PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES ANNOTATED]
[§ 386) § 5. Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement
in a concise and summary form of the material facts on which the party plead-
ing relies for his claim, or defense, as the case may be, but not the evidence
by which they are to be proved, or inferences, or conclusions of law, and shall
be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each of which shall contain
but one material allegation. Every pleading shall have attached to it copies
of all notes, contracts, book entries, or a particular reference to the records of
any court within the county in which the action is brought, if any, upon which
the party pleading relies for his claim, or defense, as the case may be; and a
particular reference to such record, or to the record of any deed or mortgage,
or other instrument of writing, recorded in such county, shall be sufficient in
lieu of a copy thereof.
[§ 735] § 17. In actions of assumpsit the prothonotary may enter judg-
ment for want of an affidavit of defense, or for any amount admitted or not
denied to be due. The plaintiff may take a rule for judgment for want of a
sufficient affidavit of defense to the whole or any part of his claim, and the
court shall enter judgment or discharge the rule, as justice may require. When
the defendant sets up a set-off, counterclaim, or new matter, he may move for
judgment against the plaintiff for want of a reply, or for want of a sufficient
reply to the whole or any part of the set-off, counterclaim, or new matter; and the
court may enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff, or the defendant, for such
amount as shall be found due, with leave to proceed for the balance, or such
other judgment as justice may require.
[§ 737] § 19. When the plaintiff asks for an account, and moves for
judgment for want of an affidavit of defense, or for want of sufficient affidavit
of defense, the court may enter an order for an account, which may be enforced
by attachment or otherwise, and judgment may be entered for the amount shown
to be due in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.
[§ 4713 § 20. The defendant in the affidavit of defense may raise any
question of law, without answering the averments of fact in the statement of
claim; and any question of law, so raised, may be set down for hearing, and
disposed of by the court. If in the opinion of the court the decision of such ques-
tion of law disposes of the whole or any part of the claim, the court may enter
judgment for the defendant, or make such other order as may be just. If the
court shall decide the question of law, so raised, against the defendant, he may
file a supplemental affidavit of defense to the averments of fact of the statement
within fifteen days.
[§ 491] § 21. The court, upon motion, may strike from the record a plead-
ing which does not conform to the provisions of this act, and may allow an
amendment or a new pleading, to be filed upon such terms as it may direct: Pro-
vided, That such motion to strike from the record any such pleading shall be
filed, and a copy thereof served upon the party filing such pleading, or his at-
torney, within fifteen days after a copy of such pleading shall have been served
upon the opposite party or his attorney.
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